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Abstract
We study an endogenous opinion (or, belief) dynamics model where we endogenize the social
network that models the link (‘trust’) weights between agents. Our network adjustment mechanism
is simple: an agent increases her weight for another agent if that agent has been close to truth
(whence, our adjustment criterion is ‘past performance’). Moreover, we consider multiply biased
agents that do not learn in a fully rational manner but are subject to persuasion bias — they learn
in a DeGroot manner, via a simple ‘rule of thumb’ — and that have biased initial beliefs. In addition,
we also study this setup under conformity, opposition, and homophily —which are recently suggested
variants of DeGroot learning in social networks — thereby taking into account further biases agents
are susceptible to. Our main focus is on crowd wisdom, that is, on the question whether the so biased
agents can adequately aggregate dispersed information and, consequently, learn the true states of the
topics they communicate about. In particular, we present several conditions under which wisdom
fails.
1 Introduction
Crowds can be amazingly wise, even wiser than the most accurate individuals among them. An early
formalization of this insight has been Concordet’s Jury theorem from 1785 [22], which states that a simple
majority vote of the opinions of independent and fallible lay-people may provide near-perfect accuracy
if the number of voters is sufficiently large.1 Over a hundred years later, in 1906, Francis Galton [38]
found strong empirical support of Concordet’s theoretical finding at an agricultural fair in Plymouth.
At a weight-judging contest, participants were asked to privately estimate the weight of a chosen live
ox after it had been slaughtered and dressed (meaning that the head and other parts were removed).
The winner was the one whose estimate was closest to the true weight of the ox. When analyzing the
results in a Nature article the following year, Galton found that the simple average of the entire crowd
was even more accurate than the winner and that the median of the 787 valid guesses, 1197 pounds, was
extremely close to the true weight, 1198 pounds (cf. Bahrami, Olsen, Bang, Roepstorff, Rees, and Frith
(2012) [7], Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2011) [3]). This finding was obtained even though most participants
were no ‘experts’ in this contest, with little specialized knowledge in butchery; yet, their estimates could
obviously contribute to the crowds’ overall success. Galton took this result as evidence that democratic
political systems may work.
Yet, contradicting this optimistic viewpoint concerning the wisdom of crowds, it has also been ob-
served that groups of individuals may be quite fallible, and possibly even more fallible than most or
all of their members. One result of this kind is already hidden in Concordet’s Jury theorem: namely,
if each lay-person is just slightly ‘too uniformed’ (or slightly ‘too much mistaken’), then the majority
vote may be much less accurate than each individual’s estimate. Drawing upon empirical observations,
∗My thanks go to Alexey Cherepnev for writing the Matlab programs that are underlying this work’s simulations and
for some useful discussions.
1Which also requires that each individual in the group of voters is more likely correct than not.
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a comprehensive illustration of ‘crowd madness’ has been brought forward in Scottish journalist Charles
Mackay’s (1841) [63] work The extraordinary and popular delusions and the madness of crowds, where
the author chronicles ‘humankind’s collective follies’, including financial bubbles, in the economics con-
text, and other popular ‘delusions’ such as witch-hunts and fortune-telling (cf. Bahrami, Olsen, Bang,
Roepstorff, Rees, and Frith (2012) [7]), thus challenging the claim that “two heads are better than one”.
Today — while, according to scholars’ opinions, the question of wisdom of crowds continues to be
one of the most important issues facing social sciences in the twenty-first century —2 more is known on
group wisdom and collective failure. On the one hand, the mean of the opinions of several individuals
may become increasingly accurate, for large groups, merely as a consequence of the law of large numbers.
This holds under restrictive assumptions — in particular, that the beliefs of individuals are independent
and probabilistically centered around truth such that, on an aggregate level, individual errors cancel
out. On the other hand, much empirical literature, foremostly in psychology, has documented that,
frequently, “groups outperform individuals [...], although groups typically fall short of the performance
of their highest-ability members” (Kerr, MacCoun, and Kramer (1996) [51], p.691).3 In fact, a very
recent experiment by Lorenz, Rauhut, Schweitzer, and Helbig (2011) [62] finds that ‘social influence’,
in a broad meaning, in a group causes individuals’ beliefs to become more similar over time, without
improvements in accuracy, however. Hence, much depends on how groups aggregate or process individual
opinions and also on these initial predispositions of agents. Kerr, MacCoun, and Kramer’s (1996) [51]
insight is that whether groups perform better than individuals may depend, among other things, on
the following aspects: (1) the way that groups aggregate the opinions of individuals (that is, the group
decision, or belief integrating, process), (2) the bias of individuals, and (3) the type of bias. Concerning
issue (1), the way agents in groups process their peers’ beliefs, we assume a specific structural form
below, which has empirically proved plausible for learning in the domain we consider (social networks).
Issue (2), individuals’ bias, will be another central notion in our work. The classical work of Tversky
and Kahnemann (1974) [70] documents several biases human judgment is susceptible to. In particular,
anchoring biases describe the psychological condition of humans to pay undue attention to initial values
— e.g., typically, individuals estimate the product 9× 8× 7× 6× 5× 4× 3× 2× 1 to be higher than the
product of factors in reverse order, which is attributed to subjects’ performing an initial approximate
computation based on the first few terms, which entails a biasing anchor (the same effects may happen if
the anchor is exogenously specified, e.g., by providing the subjects with random numbers as anchors and
then querying them for their own judgement). Biases of availabilty refer to the phenomenon of assessing
(and, consequently, possibly, misjudging) the probability of an event by the ‘ease with which instances
or occurrences can be brought to mind’, and, finally, biases of representativeness lead subjects to assess
the probability that an object is of a particular class (e.g., that a person has a certain profession) by the
degree to which the object is representative of the class, which may lead to judgement errors because such
reasoning ignores, e.g., base-rate frequencies. In another typological classification of bias, Kerr, MacCoun
and Kramer (1996) [51] distinguish between judgmental sins of imprecision (systematically deviating from
prescribed and precise use of information, such as ignoring Bayes’ theorem when forming beliefs or being
affected by framing; see Kahnemann and Tversky, 1984 [50]), judgmental sins of commission (using
irrelevant information to arrive at a decision, such as the attractiveness of an accused) and judgmental
sins of omission (ignoring relevant information, such as base-rate information).
We now describe the setup investigated in the current work, relating to the issues discussed above
subsequently. We consider a (social) network of individuals, or agents, that form opinions, or beliefs,
about an underlying state or a discussion topic.4 We assume that agents start with some initial beliefs, at
time zero, and then, as time progresses, learn from each other through communication. Communication
between any two individuals takes place if there is a link between them in the network. In the current
work, we assume a specific form of learning paradigm, DeGroot learning, that posits that agents update
2See the recent survey at http://bit.ly/hR3hcS.
3Groups can also blatantly fail, as, e.g., in groupthink (Janis (1972) [48]), hidden profiles (Wittenbaum and Stasser
(1996) [72]), etc. See the overview in Kerr and Tindale (2004) [52].
4Opinions or beliefs are important, from an economics perspective, because they crucially shape economic behavior:
consumers’ opinions about a product determine the demand for that product and majority opinions set the political course,
etc. See Buechel, Hellmann, and Klo¨ßner (2013) [15].
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their beliefs by taking weighted arithmetic averages of their peers’ past beliefs, whereby the weights are
given by the (social) ties between the agents in the network. Much has been said on the adequacy (or
inadequacy) of DeGroot learning — a ‘boundedly rational’ learning paradigm that posits that agents are
susceptible to persuasion bias, not properly adjusting for the repetition of information they hear — which,
as experiments claim (e.g., [19, 21]), appears as a more plausible standard of human social learning than,
e.g., fully rational Bayesian learning and we refer the reader to, e.g., DeMarzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel
(2003) [25], Golub and Jackson (2010) [39] or Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2011) [3] for extensive discussions.
While the DeGroot model of opinion formation is quite old, dating back to Morris H. DeGroot (1974)’s
[24] seminal work, the framework has only more recently received increasing attention from the economics
community.
In this context, one matter that has been put forth as a central guiding question in DeGroot learning
models, and which connects to our initial discussion, is whether the ‘na¨ıve’ DeGroot learners, who commit
the ‘sin of imprecision’ of not (properly) applying Bayes’ theorem, can, in fact, become ‘wise’ [39]. Here,
a society (set of agents) is called wise, roughly, if it reaches a consensus — in the limit, as time (discussion
periods) goes to infinity — that corresponds to truth. In Golub and Jackson (2010) [39], the question
relating to wisdom has been answered in the affirmative — (even) na¨ıve (DeGroot) learners do become
wise under rather mild conditions; namely, all that is required is that no na¨ıve learner is excessively
influential, whereby an agent is excessively influential if his social influence (how limiting beliefs depend
on this agent’s initial beliefs) does not converge to zero as society grows. In undirected networks (social
ties are mutual) with uniform weights, an obstacle to wisdom would then, e.g., be that each agent newly
entering society assigns, e.g., a constant fraction of his links to a particular agent, who would then be
excessively influential. Hence, as long as links are somewhat ‘democratically’ balanced, na¨ıve DeGroot
learners would apparently become wise. While we hold the analysis of Golub and Jackson (2010) [39] to
be an important ‘benchmark’ for DeGroot learning, we think that it is overly optimistic in at least one
of its critical two assumptions, namely, the (1) unbiasedness of agents’ initial beliefs.5
In the current work, we drop, in particular, the largely implausible, as we find, assumption (1). Our
central notion will be as illustrated in Figure 1, which we adapt from Einhorn, Hogarth, and Klempner
(1977) [31]. In words, we assume that some agents’ initial beliefs are biased, with an expected value
that is different from truth µ, and that other agents’ initial beliefs are unbiased, with an expected
value that equals truth µ — we remark here that we abstract away from the precise type of bias some
agents’ initial beliefs are subject to, that is, we are agnostic about whether, e.g., agents commit sins
of imprecision, commission, or omission in forming their initial beliefs, simply assuming that at least
some agents’ initial beliefs are biased. We might, if we wish, label the first kind of agents ‘non-experts’
and the second ‘experts’, although this might be slightly misleading, as even experts can be biased, of
course; nonetheless, for convenience, we keep this terminology in the following. A situation as sketched
may be quite challenging to assess, for individuals. Ignoring non-experts may be suboptimal, in some
circumstances, because their verdicts may still not be totally irrelevant in that their opinions may have
(relatively) large probability of being close to truth. Consider, in particular, the bottom part of Figure
1 where the ‘expert’ is unbiased but has high variance. In this case, for each ‘closeness interval’ around
truth, the non-expert’s initial belief has higher probability of falling within this interval than the expert’s
beliefs. Thus, if there is exactly one expert and one non-expert, it would be optimal, for an outside
observer, to disregard the expert’s opinion and, in the absence of further information, adopt the non-
expert’s opinion. However, if there are many experts with identical and independent distributions and
also many non-experts with identical and independent distributions, then an optimal aggregation of
information would ignore the non-experts’ and average the experts’ opinions.
We study this setup in an endogenous DeGroot learning model, where we endogenize the (social)
network. In particular, we assume that the ‘trust’ links between agents in the network are based on
‘past performance’, which has been outlined as a relevant reputation building criterion in the psychology
literature (cf. Yaniv and Kleinberger (2000) [74], Yaniv (2004) [73]). We think that the endogenous model
5The other critical assumption is biasedness of the belief formation process (DeGroot learning — agents are prone to
persuasion bias). Finally, of crucial relevance is also independence of agents’ initial beliefs, which we do not challenge here,
however.
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Figure 1: Schematic illustration of experts’ and non-experts’ distribution of initial beliefs. Right figures
show probability masses of falling within an (arbitrary) small interval around truth, for both experts
and non-experts.
is the ‘right’ setup for our investigation of wisdom in DeGroot learning under biased initial beliefs because
if the network structure is assumed exogenous, then one relatively uninteresting solution to the wisdom
problem would, e.g., be to ignore the biased agents — in contrast, in the endogenous model, the question
arises what weighting scheme individuals actually learn for the biased (and unbiased) agents, under given
assumptions concerning the agents’ behavior. Since we learn the network structure endogenously, by
looking at agents’ past performance (how often have they been close to truth previously?), we necessarily
study learning in a repeated setting, where agents are involved in repeated communications overmultitudes
of topics, whereby past beliefs and their external validation may inform today’s beliefs and the network
structure. Our network learning rule is quite simple: we increment the weight that one agent places
upon another by some δ > 0 if the latter agent has been in a predefined ‘η-radius’ around truth for the
current topic. We show that this is a ‘utility maximizing’ rule6 provided that agents expect, subjectively,
that all other agents’ beliefs are unbiased, which we call the bona fides (or, ‘good faith’) assumption.
Intruigingly, the bona fides assumption concerning the unbiasedness of other agents’ initial beliefs may be
consistent with the ‘egocentric bias’ hypothesis which suggests that “interacting human agents operate
under the assumption that their collaborators’ decisions and opinions share the same level of reliability”
as their own; the upholding of this bias, even despite potential collective failure, might then be due to
6Or at least a good approximation to a solution of a maximization problem.
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the social obligation to treat others as equal to oneself, despite their conspicuous inadequacy, or due to
the urge to contribute to the group (Bahrami, Olsen, Bang, Roepstorff, Rees, and Frith (2012) [7]).
To summarize our model, in our setup, agents hold beliefs and learn, via communication, about a
multitude of topics X1, X2, X3, . . ., each with an associated ‘truth’ µ1, µ2, µ3, . . .. Within each topic Xk,
‘discussion rounds’ are indexed by discrete time steps t = 0, 1, 2, . . . and in each time step t ≥ 1, agents
update their beliefs on Xk by integrating their peers’ beliefs, starting with some exogenously specified
initial beliefs on Xk. After a topic has been communicated about (for an infinite amount of time), truth
µk is revealed, whereupon agents adjust the ‘trust’ weights they assign to other agents (they ‘learn’, or
‘grow’, the network topology) based on agents’ past performance: if an agent has been close to truth for
topic Xk, agents increase their trust for this agent by increasing the respective weight by δ. Our agents
are multiply biased (or ‘na¨ıve’):
(i) At least some agents’ initial beliefs are systematically biased in that the expected values of their
initial beliefs are different from truth µk, for all k = 1, 2, 3, . . .. For initial beliefs, we abstract away
from the particular kind of bias agents are subject to, simply assuming that some kind of bias plays
a role.
(ii) Agents are subject to persuasion bias in updating their beliefs on Xk in that they apply the
DeGroot learning paradigm rather than a fully rational Bayesian belief updating framework.
(iii) In adjusting weights for other agents, agents are egocentrically biased : they assume that their own
judgments are relevant (more precisely, their initial beliefs are unbiased) and they assume that
their peers’ beliefs share the same level of reliability as their own (more precisely, that their peers’
initial beliefs are also unbiased). This bias justifies the weight adjustment rule — adding δ — that
we have sketched (see Section 3).
Besides this basic setup, we consider refinements of standard DeGroot learning recently suggested —
DeGroot learning under opposition, conformity, and homophily — in each case incorporating our endo-
genized network structure and, in addition, the three kinds of biases discussed above. We show that,
in these more refined versions of DeGroot learning, which are supposed to endow the DeGroot learning
paradigm with a more ‘realistic’ structure, wisdom is even more difficult to arrive at, as we discuss below.
Our main contributions over existing work are as follows.
• We more thoroughly investigate the concept of bias in social (network) learning — or more specifi-
cially, DeGroot learning — than previous literature. In particular, as mentioned, we allow agents’
initial beliefs to be biased and consider further biases, as discussed.
• We endogenize the network structure in DeGroot learning and we do so by referring to the notion of
‘past performance’. Of course, in the vast literature on networks, (‘endogenous’) network formation
processes are not novel; often, however, the network is adapted, in the literature more or less
relevant to our setup, by adding or deleting (costly) links as in Jackson and Watts (2002) [47],
Goyal (2004) [41], etc., rather than by increasing link weight based on agents’ past performance.
In DeGroot learning, self-evolving networks are discussed, e.g., in the work on DeGroot learning and
homophily (e.g., Pan (2010) [67] and the Hegselmann and Krause models), but weight adjustments
based on truth, as we model, must be considered distinct from these mechanisms.
• As mentioned, we consider multitudes of topics, rather than a single topic, in DeGroot learning,
and we crucially allow truth to be revealed at some stage. This differs from all the previous work,
where agents have been in the unfortunate situation of eternally communicating about a given
topic, without ever knowing its true state.
• We incoporate other DeGroot variants in our setup. In particular, we provide an alternative to the
homophily model designed by Hegselmann and Krause [44], see Section 9.
• We derive a microeconomic foundation for weight adjustments as we implement by defining an
individual agent’s optimization problem — in particular, we assume that agents have negative
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utility from not knowing truth — and by computing a closed-form solution to this problem.7 We
then show how our heuristic weight adjustment rule — adding δ — corresponds to the solution of
the optimization problem.
Our main findings are as follows.
• For the standard model, we first show that agents reach a consensus for almost all topics Xk, under
weak conditions, in our endogenized DeGroot learning paradigm (Proposition 6.1 and Remark 6.2).
This confirms the commonly held belief (cf. Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2011) [3]) that the standard
DeGroot model leads agents to consensus (so easily) but also shows that, in our endogenized model,
conditons that prevent consensus are, in fact, not satisfied.
• Next, we illustrate that if all agents’ initial beliefs are unbiased, then agents in fact reach a consensus
that is even correct, for ‘large’ topics Xk and as agent group size n becomes large. This holds both
when agents adjust weights based on limiting beliefs and on initial beliefs (Propositions 6.3 and 6.4,
respectively); we define the notions of relevant weight adjustment time points below. When there
are biased agents, then agents’ limiting beliefs are generally a convex combination of the unbiased
agents’ initial beliefs and the biased agents’ initial beliefs. We demonstrate the truthfulness of this
claim under various parametrizations (Propositions 6.5, 6.7, 6.8). We also give sufficient conditions
on when agents may converge to truth, for large topics, even under the presence of biased agents
(Propositions 6.5 and 6.6), but these conditions are ‘low probability events’ (or require a sufficiently
high valuation of truth) and they hold only under the particular parametrization that agents stop
learning the network topology in case ‘everything is fine’, as we define below.
That limiting consensus beliefs are convex combinations of biased and unbiased beliefs may imply
that limiting beliefs are ‘arbitrarily’ far off from truth, provided that the number of biased agents
is sufficiently large (Corollary 6.3), thus demonstrating that agents do not optimally aggregate
information in our endogenized DeGroot learning model, at least under certain conditions.
• Next, for opinion dynamics ‘under opposition’, a recently suggested DeGroot learning variant where
agents are motivated by ‘ingroup’/‘outgroup’ relationships [30], we show that even if all agents’
initial beliefs are unbiased and, more particularly, agents receive arbitrarily accurate initial signals
about topics, some agents may be arbitarily far off from truth. In other words, we show that
if agents have additional incentives besides truth, namely, to disassociate from unliked others —
such agents must be thought of as additionally biased; namely, they must be thought of as, e.g.,
committing the sin of omission to ignore the unliked others’ relevant information and the sin of
commission to incorporate irrelevant information, namely, the ‘opposite’ of unliked others’ beliefs
—8 then wisdom is even more difficult to attain. This, in particular, concerns several important
fields of everyday life, such as the political arena.
• Then, for DeGroot learning ‘under conformity’ — that is, when agents want to conform to a
reference opinion (again, which may be thought of as a sin of commission) — another recent variant
of DeGroot learning [14], we show that even if the unbiased agents have never been truthful in
the past, they may become arbitrarily influential, something that is not possible in the standard
model, and which, again, shows that additional biases may worsen the case for wisdom.
• Finally, in case homophily also plays a role — that is, when agents have the tendency to adjust
the social network topology based on agents with similar beliefs — then, again, wisdom is more
difficult to arrive at. We show this (only) by simulation since this process is (much) more difficult
to analyze analytically as it deals with learning matrices that are changing over time (and not
only across topics). In our context, homophily can also be seen as a search bias in which subjects
overrate beliefs that are close to their own (cf. Kunda (1990) [55]).
7In spirit, our approach is similar to that of DeMarzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel (2003) [25].
8They may generally be thought of as biased toward ingroup members, cf. Brewer (1979) [12].
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The structure of this work is as follows. In Section 2, we present related work, beyond what we have
already referred to. In Section 3, we give a formal outline of our model, and, in Section 4, a ‘justification’
of our network learning rule. In Section 5, we introduce relevant notation. Then, in Sections 6, 7, 8,
and 9, we derive our results, as outlined above, on the standard model, and the DeGroot variants under
opposition, conformity, and homophily, respectively. In Section 10, we conclude. We list several proofs
in the appendices; there, we also report on a ‘small-scale’ experiment on the (un)biasedness (and the
distribution) of individuals’ (initial) beliefs concerning several ‘common knowledge questions’.
Before actually listing related work in Section 2, we now briefly discuss this experiment and the
lessons that we learn from it.
A small-scale experiment concerning the (un)biasedness of individuals’ beliefs. As we have
mentioned, some research papers have assumed that individuals’ initial beliefs on topics are unbiased,
that is, centered around truth. Certainly, this assumption may sometimes be plausible, e.g., depending on
the topic, but, as we have indicated, we do not think that the condition holds across a large spectrum of
circumstances. We conducted an experiment where we asked individuals on Amazon Mechanical Turk9
16 ‘common knowledge questions’. The questions ranged from, to our opinion, rather easy problems such
as ‘What do you think is the year the first world war started?’ or ‘What do you think is 17− 4× 2?’ to
rather difficult problems, such as ‘What do you think is the number of people per square mile in China’s
capital Beijing?’ or ‘What do you think is the diameter of the sun in miles?’. We list all 16 questions in
Appendix B.
On all questions, more than n = 100 subjects answered (between n = 110 to n = 119). Analyzing
the answers (see Figures 16 and 17), we find that, typically, neither the mean of the answers nor the
median are very close to the true value. In fact, on only 8 out of 16 questions is the median (which tends
to be more reliable since it is not so much affected by outliers) within a 10% interval around truth, and
on only 6 out of 16 questions does this hold for the mean. Looking at 1% intervals, these numbers drop
to 6 and 2, respectively (for the mean, these questions are about the start of the first world war and the
average height of an adult male US American). Such low numbers were truly surprising if in fact the
assumptions of unbiasedness and independence of (initial) beliefs were true, given the validity of the law
of large numbers. A slightly more detailed analysis is given in Appendix B.
2 Related Work
Early and frequently cited predecessors of DeGrootian opinion dynamics are French (1956) [34] and
Harary (1959) [43], although the now famous ‘averaging’ model of opinion and consensus formation has
only been popularized through the seminal work of DeGroot (1974) [24]. At about the same time, Lehrer
and Wagner [71, 57, 56] have developed a model of rational consensus formation in society that, in both
its implications and its mathematical structure, is very similar to the DeGroot model. In the sociology
literature, Friedkin and Johnson (1990) [35] and Friedkin and Johnson (1999) [36] develop models of
social influence that generalize the DeGroot model. In more recent years, a renewed economic interest in
the DeGroot model of opinion dynamics has emerged, leading to a number of further extensions proposed.
For example, DeMarzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel (2002) [25], besides sketching psychological justifications
for DeGroot learning relating to persuasion bias as discussed above, discuss time-varying weights on
own beliefs that capture, e.g., the idea of a ‘hardening of positions’: over time, individuals may be more
inclined to rely on their own beliefs rather than on those of their peers. Further extensions of the classical
DeGroot model include Golub and Jackson (2010) [39], whose contribution is to analyze weight structures
such that DeGroot learners whose initial beliefs are stochastically centered around truth converge to a
consensus that is correct, and the works of Daron Acemoglu and colleagues. For example, Acemoglu,
Ozdaglar and ParandehGheibi (2010) [4] distinguish between regular and forceful agents, such as, in
an economic interpretation, monopolistic media (forceful agents influence others disproportionately),
and Acemoglu, Como, Fagnani, and Ozdaglar [1] distinguish between regular and stubborn agents (the
latter never update), to account for the phenomenon of disagreement in societies; in Yildiz, Acemoglu,
9Available at https://www.mturk.com/mturk/.
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Ozdaglar, Saberi, and Scaglione [75], a discrete version of the DeGroot model with stubborn agents
is analyzed in which regular agents randomly adopt one of their neighbors’ binary opinions. Another
interesting DeGroot variant is discussed in Buechel, Hellmann and Klo¨ßner (2012) [14] where agents’
stated opinions may differ from their true (or private) opinions and where it is assumed that agents
generally wish to state an opinion that is close to that of their peer group even if their true opinions
may be very different (which is the ‘conformity’ aspect of their model); we review this work in more
depth in Section 8. A similar approach is given in Buechel, Hellmann and Pichler (2012) [16], where
DeGroot learning is applied to an overlapping generations model in which parents transmit traits to their
children. Receivers who deviate from the opinion signals sent by senders — rebels — are discussed in
Cao, Yang, Qu, and Yang (2011) [17]; see also the modeling in Zhang, Cao, Qin, and Yang (2013) [77]
where such behavior is interpreted in a ‘fashion’ context. A model with more general ‘ingroup/outgroup’
relationships and opposition toward outgroup members is described in Eger (2013) [30], which we discuss
in more detail in Section 7. Multi-dimensional real opinion spaces have been considered in Lorenz (2006)
[60] and a survey of generalizations of DeGroot models developed within physicist communities (e.g.,
density-based approaches in place of agent-based systems) is provided by Lorenz (2007) [61]. Groeber,
Lorenz, and Schweitzer (2013) [42] provide ‘dissonance minimization’ as a general microfoundation of a
variety of heterogenous DeGroot-like opinion dynamics models.
Concerning DeGroot models with endogenous weight formation, one pattern of endogenous weight
formation that has been studied in the literature is weight formation based on a homophily princi-
ple, in which agents assign positive weights to those individuals whose current opinions are ‘similar’
with their own. In Hegselmann and Krause (2002) [44] — an approach with many extensions such
as [45, 46, 27, 28, 29] — this leads to very interesting patterns of opinion formation in which, most
prominently, the paradigms of plurality, polarization and consensus are observed, depending on specific
parametrizations — most importantly, the definition of similarity, i.e., whether individuals are tolerant
or not toward other opinions, affects which opinion pattern emerges. The model of Deffuant, Neau, Am-
blard, and Weisbuch (2000) [23] is identical in setup to the Hegselmann and Krause model, except that
two randomly determined agents, rather than all agents, update beliefs in each time step. Pan (2010)
[67] discusses a homophily variant in which agents assign trust weights to other agents in proportion to
agents’ current opinion distance — rather than by thresholding, as done in the Hegselmann and Krause
models and in Deffuant, Neau, Amblard, and Weisbuch (2000) [23] — which typically entails a consensus,
in the limit. Homophily and DeGroot learning is also investigated in Golub and Jackson (2012) [40],
where the relationship between the speed of DeGrootian learning and homophily is discussed; in this
model, homophily is — exogenously, however — modeled by random networks where the link probability
between different groups is non-uniform, and is, in fact, higher between individuals of the same group.
Endogenous weight formation typically implies time-varying weight matrices as belief updating operators
and mathematical results on corresponding processes are, for instance, given in Lorenz (2005) [59].
Recent empirical and experimental evidence on the validity of the DeGroot heuristic for learning
in social networks has been provided in, e.g., Chandrasekhar, Larreguy, and Xandri (2012) [19] and
Corazzini, Pavesi, Petrovich, and Stanca (2012) [21]. Interesting in our context is also the experiment
by Lorenz, Rauhut, Schweitzer and Helbing (2011) [62], where individuals are placed in a situation
consistent with our setup: individuals observe their peers’ past beliefs (on social/geopolitical issues)
and may update their current opinions accordingly. In addition, truth on each of the discussed topics
becomes revealed, by the experimenter, after a certain fixed amount of time.
Social learning is also discussed in various other strands of literature besides those discussed, such as
in herding models (cf. Banerjee (1992) [8], Gale and Kaiv (2003) [37], Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004)
[9]), where agents usually converge to holding the same belief as to an optimal action. This conclusion
generally applies to the observational learning setting (cf. Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille (2006) [68],
Acemoglu, Dahleh, Lobel, and Ozdaglar (2008) [2]), where agents are observing choices and/or payoffs
of other agents over time and are updating accordingly. See also the references and the discussion
in Golub and Jackson (2010) [39]. General overviews over social learning, whether Bayesian or non-
Bayesian, whether based on communication or observation, are, in the economics context, for example
given in Lobel (2000) [58] and Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2011) [3]. In Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2011) [3],
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an extensive discussion of the ‘pros and cons’ of fully rational learning models versus boundedly rational
(most importantly, DeGroot-like) heuristics is provided.
As discussed in the introduction, group opinion and belief formation and decision making also has
a long history in psychology. A crucial difference between such models and models of social learning is
that, in the psychology studies and models, it is usually assumed, and even explicity demanded, for the
group of individuals to reach a consensus in the course of the discussion process. A general overview
over group decision making is given in Kerr and Tindale (2004) [52] and other relevant literature, besides
that sketched in the introduction, is, for example, Mannes (2009) [64] and Budescu, Rantilla, Yu, and
Karelitz (2003) [13].
3 Model
A finite set [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} of n agents discusses a sequence X1, X2, X3, . . . of topics. Each agent
i = 1, . . . , n holds initial beliefs bki (0) ∈ S on issue Xk, where k = 1, 2, 3, . . . and where S is a convex set
that we may innocuously assume to be the whole of R. Moreover, each topic has a corresponding truth
µk ∈ S which denotes the ‘true evaluation’ of topic Xk. Agents update their beliefs on Xk by taking a
weighted average of all other agents’ beliefs, starting from initial beliefs:
bki (t+ 1) =
n∑
j=1
W
(k)
ij b
k
j (t), (3.1)
where t = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . and where W
(k)
ij denotes the weight (‘trust’) that agent i assigns agent j for topic
Xk; in Section 9, we let W
(k)
ij also depend on time t, i.e., W
(k)
ij =W
(k)
ij (t). We let the limiting beliefs of
agent i for issue Xk be denoted by b
k
i (∞). Moreover, we assume that weight matrix W(k) — which we
also interpret as a ‘learning matrix’, or, as a (social) network — is row-stochastic for every topic k, that
is,
∀i, j : 0 ≤W (k)ij ≤ 1, and ∀i :
n∑
j=1
W
(k)
ij = 1,
which means that the weights that agents assign each other are normalized to unity; we furthermore
assume that weights carry over from one topic to another, as we explicate below. Crucially, we consider
an endogenous weight formation process where agents adjust the weights they attribute to other agents
based on the foundational principle of truth.
• If agent j has known truth µk for issue Xk (or, was ‘close enough’), then it seems natural for agent
i to increase his trust in j. Formally, we let
W
(k+1)
ij =
{
W
(k)
ij + δ · T (
∣∣N(bk(∞), µk)∣∣) if ∥∥bkj (τ)− µk∥∥ < η,
W
(k)
ij otherwise,
(3.2)
for all k ≥ 1; by ‖·‖, we denote the absolute distance and by |A| the cardinality of set A. Here,
N(bk(τ), µk) ⊆ {1, . . . , n} is the set of all agents i whose belief bki (τ) for Xk at time τ is within
an η-radius of µk and T : {1, . . . , n} → [0,∞] is a function for which we specify the following:
m1 ≤ m2 =⇒ T (m1) ≥ T (m2) (T is non-increasing in its argument; ‘knowing truth pays a
weakly larger trust increment the less people know it’; see our discussion below). The variable τ
models the relevant adjustment time point; we consider τ = 0 (‘adjusting based on initial beliefs’)
and τ = ∞ (‘adjusting based on limiting beliefs’). We take the variables η, with η ≥ 0, and δ,
with δ > 0, as exogenous variables. We also refer to the variable η as the agents’ tolerance since it
describes the interval within which agents are tolerant against deviations from truth.
Updating in case bkj (τ) is close to truth rather than exactly truth may be interpreted as a bound-
edly rational heuristic for agents who cannot assess truth with infinite precision. Note that after
adjusting weights, we renormalize weight matrices in order for them to satisfy the row-stochasticity
condition.
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Discussion
Our endogenous DeGroot model appears quite simple and natural — we let agents adjust the networkW
in a way that incorporates ‘past performance’: whenever an agent has been close enough to truth, agents
increase their trust for this agent by δ — except, possibly, for the weight adjustment time points and the
factor T (·). Concerning weight adjustment time points, the question is what is the relevant time point
that an agent’s belief should be (or is) compared to truth µk for some issue Xk. Note that, for any issue
Xk, there are infinitely many possible such time points — t = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . — so this question admits
no straightforward answer. We consider two relevant time points, namely, the beliefs that agents hold
initially, at the beginning of communication, and the beliefs that agents hold in the limit, as time goes to
infinity; these beliefs are agents’ limiting beliefs, after communication on topic Xk has terminated. Both
time points have some intuitive appeal, as we think. Initial beliefs say something on an agent’s ‘innate
ability’, before learning from others, and limiting beliefs may possibly be a more realistic reference point
for weight adjustments if agents are perceived of as having ‘limited memory’ (limiting beliefs are the
‘most recent’ observations).10 Concerning the function T (·), our intuition is as follows. The larger the
group of agents who know the correct answer (or, as we consider as equivalent throughout, are ‘close
enough’ to truth) for a given topic — that is, the larger is the set of agents whose limiting beliefs are
correct — the smaller should be the trust weight increment that agents assign each other. Intuitively, the
number of agents who are correct for a topic may be indicative of the topic’s ‘difficulty’ or ‘hardness’.11
If T (x) = 0, for some x, then this means that the network is not adjusted if at least x agents know the
truth on any one topic.12 Consider Figure 2 for three typical exemplars of T (·), as we have in mind.
Figure 2: Three possible specifications of the function T in (3.2). Note that T is always non-increasing,
as we have defined. For example, the red function is T (·) = 1 and the dashed green function has T (n) = 0
and T (x) > 0 for x < n.
We also point out that, in our model, we logically differentiate between what is ‘innate knowledge’ (or,
simply, ‘ability’) and what is socially learned from others in that we think of initial beliefs as capturing
ability and updating beliefs based on others’ beliefs as the social learning process. Finally, we remark that
we generally think of topics Xk as ‘of the same kind’ — that is, all of them are on sports or mathematics
or natural science or politics or the stock market, etc. — in order to justify why network weights should
carry over from one topic to another; see also our dicussion below.
10Of course, it could be argued that an agent’s ‘average belief’, somehow weighted over time, might also be a quantity
that could be compared with truth µk.
11To make a crude example, ‘everyone’ may know what 3 + 3 is — so that correct knowledge of this answer may not
justify increased trust — but it took an Euclid to first discover the infinitude of the set of prime numbers.
12The condition T (x) = 0 may also be paraphrased as meaning that ‘if at least x agents know truth on any one topic,
then the network need not be changed’ — that is, ‘everything is fine’ if at least x (e.g., x = n) agents know truth.
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Almost all throughout the work, we assume that agents are homogenous with respect to the tolerances
η, the weight increments δ, and adjustment time points τ .
4 A justification of our weight adjustment procedure
The choice of a rational agent
We now derive a (micro-founded) justification of our weight adjustment rule (3.2). We first assume that
agents i = 1, . . . , n have disutilities from not knowing truth for topic Xk, for k = 1, 2, . . .. More precisely,
we assume that agent i has utility function Ui from weight structure W
(k) for issue Xk as
Ui(W
(k)) = Ui(W
(k);µk, b
k
1(0), . . . , b
k
n(0)) = −F
(
d(bki (∞), µk)
)
, (4.1)
where F : R≥0 → R≥0 is monotonically increasing and d is a metric — that is, in particular, d(a, b) = 0
if and only if a = b — and where we assume that µk and initial beliefs b
k
1(0), . . . , b
k
n(0) are exogenous;
also note how bki (∞) depends onW(k) (and bk1(0), . . . , bkn(0)) via process (3.1). In other words, according
to utility function (4.1), a larger distance between i’s limiting belief bki (∞) and truth µk does not lead
to larger utility of agent i and when bki (∞) = µk, then agent i attains maximum possible utility. For
technical ease, we assume that d is the Euclidean distance and F has the simple quadratic form F (z) = z2
such that
Ui(W
(k)) = − ∥∥bki (∞)− µk∥∥2 = −(bki (∞)− µk)2.
Now, we assume that [W(k)]i, by which we denote the i-th row of W
(k), are the endogenous variables
of agent i she wants to set in such a way as to maximize her utility Ui. Since agent i cannot affect the
weight structure choices of agents i′, with i 6= i′, we write Ui as a function of [W(k)]i, rather than W(k).
Hence, we write
Ui
(
[W(k)]i
)
= −(bki (∞)− µk)2.
Assume next that agents i = 1, . . . , n have ‘limited foresight’ or ‘finite horizon’ in that they cannot
foresee the dynamics of belief updating process (3.1) (which would also require knowledge of the other
agents’ weight choices) but that they take bki (1) as a reference variable, rather than b
k
i (∞).
Assumption 4.1. Agents i = 1, . . . , n have limited foresight or finite horizon. They choose weights
[Wk(0)]i to maximize
Ui
(
[W(k)]i
)
= −(bki (1)− µk)2 = −( n∑
j=1
W
(k)
ij b
k
j (0)− µk
)2
.
Our next assumption is that initial beliefs bk1(0), . . . , b
k
n(0) are random variables.
Assumption 4.2. Initial beliefs bk1(0), . . . , b
k
n(0) are random variables.
From Assumption 4.2, it follows that agents become expected utility maximizers : they choose weights
[W(k)]i to maximize
Ei
[
Ui
(
[W(k)]i
)]
.
Our final assumption says that agents expect their own and other agents’ initial beliefs to be correct,
which we call the bona fides (“good faith”) assumption.
Assumption 4.3. Agents i = 1, . . . , n are bona fide, that is,
Ei[b
k
j (0)] = µk, for all j = 1, . . . , n, and all k = 1, 2, 3, . . .
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Now, we derive agents’ maximization problem under Assumptions 4.1 to 4.3. To this end, let X
denote the random variable
X =
n∑
j=1
W
(k)
ij b
k
j (0). (4.2)
With this notation, agents’ utility maximization problems become, under our named assumptions, for
each agent i = 1, . . . , n:
max
[W(k)]i
Ei
[
Ui
(
[W(k)]i
)]
= Ei

−( n∑
j=1
W
(k)
ij b
k
j (0)− µk
)2 = −Ei[(X − Ei[X ])2]
s.t. W
(k)
i1 + . . .+W
(k)
in = 1,
(4.3)
since Ei[X ] =
∑n
j=1W
(k)
ij Ei[b
k
j (0)] = µk
∑n
j=1W
(k)
ij = µk and where we assume row-stochasticity of
W(k). Now, Ei
[
(X − Ei[X ])2
]
= Vari[X ] and hence, agents’ utility maximization problems may be
rewritten as
max
[W(k)]i
−Vari[X ] = min
[W(k)]i
Vari[X ]
s.t. W
(k)
i1 + . . .+W
(k)
in = 1,
(4.4)
that is, agents strive to set weights W
(k)
i1 , . . . ,W
(k)
in such that Vari[X ] is minimized subject to the row-
stochasticity condition on W(k). To simplify the solution to problem (4.4), we additionally assume
independence of bk1(0), . . . , b
k
n(0).
Assumption 4.4. The variables bk1(0), . . . , b
k
n(0) are independent random variables.
Finally, we assume that agents expect the variables b1j(0), b
2
j(0), b
3
j(0), . . . to be independent with
identical variances. If this were not the case, agents’ reliability across topics would vary so that statistical
regularities — inference from past performance to current performance — could not be exploited.
Assumption 4.5. Each agent i ∈ [n] expects the random variables b1j(0), b2j(0), b3j(0), . . . to be indepen-
dent random variables with identical variances, that is,
Vari[b
1
j(0)] = Vari[b
2
j(0)] = Vari[b
3
j(0)] = · · ·
for all j = 1, . . . , n.
Under Assumptions 4.4 and 4.5, Vari[X ] may be written as
Vari[X ] =
n∑
j=1
(W
(k)
ij )
2 Vari[b
k
j (0)] =
n∑
j=1
α2ijσ
2
ij ,
where we let, for short, αij =W
(k)
ij (here, we may omit the dependence on k since W
(k)
ij are optimization
variables that do not, intrinsically, depend on topic Xk) and σ
2
ij = Vari[b
k
j (0)] (here, we may omit the
dependence on k due to Assumption 4.5). Thus, to solve problem (4.4) under Assumptions 4.4 and 4.5,
each agent i = 1, . . . , n minimizes the ‘Lagrange’ function
Li(αi1, . . . , αin) =
n∑
j=1
α2ijσ
2
ij − λ(
n∑
j=1
αij − 1) (4.5)
for some ‘Lagrange multiplier’ λ. Via the first-order conditions, this leads to
αij =
λ
2σ2ij
,
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and from
∑n
j=1 αij = 1, we find that
n∑
j=1
λ
2σ2ij
= 1 ⇐⇒ λ = 2∑n
j=1 σ
−2
ij
.
Thus, under Assumptions 4.1 to 4.5, a rational agent chooses weights W
(k)
ij that satisfy
W
(k)
ij = αij =
1
Vari[bkj (0)]∑n
j′=1
(
Vari[bkj′(0)]
)−1 ∝ 1Vari[bkj (0)] , (4.6)
which is quite an intuitive result: the larger the variance of agent j’s estimate bkj (0) — or, more precisely,
what agent i thinks of this variance to be — the lower should the weight be that agent i assigns j, since
j’s initial belief tends to be ‘away from truth’ more frequently — or, more precisely, i expects j’s initial
belief to be so.
A comparison with the heuristic weight adjustment rule (3.2)
To compare the ‘optimal’ weight adjustment rule under Assumptions 4.1 to 4.5 with the heuristic rule
(3.2), note first that weight adjustment rule (3.2) amounts to (weighted) ‘counting’ of how often a
particular agent j has been in an η interval around truth µk, since, each time j has been within this
interval, the weight of i for j is increased by the term δ · T (·). Hence, denoting the weights defined via
rule (3.2) by W˜
(k)
ij for the moment and the remainder of this section, we have
W˜
(k)
ij ∝ Rkj (η),
where Rkj (η) is the number of times agent j has been in an η-interval around truth within the first k
discussion topics,
Rkj (η) =
∣∣{h ∈ {1, . . . , k} | ∥∥bhj (τ)− µk∥∥ < η}∣∣.
Now, if Assumptions 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 hold and if τ = 0, then clearly, Rkj (η) is inversely related to
Vari[b
k
j (0)], for all j = 1, . . . , n, since if R
k
j (η) is low, then i thinks that j has high variance (around
j’s presumed expected value of Ei[b
k
j (0)] = µk) and analogously if R
k
j (η) is high. Hence, under these
assumptions, weight adjustment rule (3.2) entails weights W˜
(k)
ij which satisfy
W˜
(k)
ij ∝
1
Vari[bkj (0)]
.
Thus, to summarize, if
• Assumptions 4.1 to 4.5 hold and if,
• τ = 0 (adjusting based on initial beliefs),
then, heuristic weight adjustment rule (3.2) corresponds, by analogy, to an adjustment rule that a rational
agent would implement, under the named assumptions.
Discussion
Some of the assumptions we have made require further discussion. Assumption 4.1, which says that
agents have limited foresight and want to minimize the distance between bki (1) and µk, rather than
between bki (∞) and µk, may not only be perceived as the choice of a boundedly rational agent. In
contrast, if agent i knows, or at least assumes, that all agents are similarly rational as her (and share
the same information structure, etc., that is, are perfectly homogeneous) — whence all agents are faced
with the same optimization problems to which they derive identical solutions [W(k)]i — then, in fact,
bk(1) = bk(∞) since W(k), for each k, is identical in each row and is row-stochastic (see Lemma A.1 in
Appendix A). So, under this prerequisite, agents could also be thought of as having ‘perfect foresight’,
knowing that bki (1) will equal b
k
i (∞) anyways. Assumption 4.2 is innocuous, while Assumption 4.3 is the
bona fides assumption discussed in the introduction, which we thought of as being based on egocentric
biases. Next, Assumption 4.4, that agents’ initial beliefs are independent, is highly implausible, of course:
individuals go to the same or similar schools, are influenced by the same or similar media, etc., all of
which may induce correlation in individuals beliefs (possibly even if we think of these beliefs as prior to
social communication); we make this assumption for technical ease, as otherwise deriving closed-form
solutions to the optimization problems in question may be quite challenging. Finally, Assumption 4.5
demands that topics are of the same general ‘area’, as we have indicated in Section 3, whence one may
expect individuals’ reliability (for this field of human expertise) to be predictable across a multitude of
topics. Forfeiting the assumption would mean to present agents with a problem where nothing can be
learned, in terms of adjusting the network structure W, across various topics.
We also mention that our above analysis has assumed that δ · T is strictly positive (for all or at least
infinitely many topics Xk), for, e.g., otherwise W˜
(k)
ij would not be proportional to R
k
j (η). In Section 6,
we also consider the case when δ · T is zero for all but finitely many topics. We treat this case, which
allows us to derive wisdom results in certain circumstances even under the presence of biased agents, as
a special (or, ‘extreme’) case of our model that differs, however, from the choice a rational agent would
pursue, as we have sketched.
Illustration
To illustrate the relationship betweenW
(k)
ij as set by a (boundedly) rational agent and as set via (heuris-
tic) weight adjustment rule (3.2), consider the following exemplary situation. Let there be n agents, all
of whose initial beliefs bki (0) are normally distributed around µk, for all topics Xk. Assume that there
are two types of agents, L and H , with variances σ2L and σ
2
H , respectively, such that σ
2
L < σ
2
H . Let there
be nL agents of type L and nH agents of type H such that nL+nH = n. In other words, for each L-type
agent iL, we have, for all k = 1, 2, 3, . . .,
bkiL(0) ∼ N(µk, σ2L),
and, accordingly, for each H-type agent iH , we have
bkiH (0) ∼ N(µk, σ2H).
Thus, under Assumptions 4.1 to 4.5, a rational agent i would assign weights,
W
(k)
ij =
1
σ2T
· 1
C
, (4.7)
where T ∈ {L,H}, depending on whether j is of type L or H , and where C is the constant C = nL
σ2
L
+ nH
σ2
H
.
In contrast, an agent who sets weights according to the rule (3.2), would set
W˜
(k)
ij ∝ Pr[
∥∥bkj (0)− µk∥∥ < η] = ∫ η
−η
1√
2πσ2T
exp(− x
2
2σ2T
) dx = 2
∫ η
0
1√
2πσ2T
exp(− x
2
2σ2T
) dx, (4.8)
depending on whether j is of type T = L or T = H . In Figure 3, we plot the behavior of (4.7) vs. (4.8)
for specific values of σ2L and σ
2
H , namely σ
2
L = 1 and σ
2
H = 2. For the values of σ
2
L and σ
2
H discussed, the
optimal rule under Assumptions 4.1 to 4.5 would accord total weight mass for L-types of nL ·W (k)ij = 34
(for j of type L), and total weight mass for H-types of nHW
(k)
ij =
1
4 (for j of type H). In contrast, as
the graphs show, if weights are set according to (4.8), then, W˜
(k)
ij is, for the L types, always lower than
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Figure 3: Throughout σ2H = 2 and n = 100 = 60 + 40 = nL + nH .
3
4 , as the optimal rule would prescribe. Depending on η, W˜
(k)
ij ranges from 0.60, if η is large, to about
0.68, for small η. The value for η large is obvious since if η is sufficiently large in size, then each agent
will receive identical weight W˜
(k)
ij ,
1
n
, and, hence, total weight mass for T -types is nT
n
, for T ∈ {L,H}.
The figure also shows the inverse relationship between W˜
(k)
ij and σ
2
T (for T = L, in this case; Figure 3
(b)), the closeness of W˜
(k)
ij to ‘optimality’ (Figure 3 (c)), and a comparison between the theoretic value
W˜
(k)
ij is proportional to, Pr[
∥∥bkj (0)− µk∥∥ < η], and actual realizations of W˜ (k)ij as a function of δ and T
(Figure 3 (d); cf. Equation (3.2)).
5 Notation and definitions
We introduce the following helpful notation and definitions.
Definition 5.1. Let any ǫ ≥ 0 be fixed. We call an agent i ǫ-intelligent for (topic) Xk if i’s initial belief
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on Xk is (ǫ) ‘close to truth’, i.e.,
∥∥bki (0)− µk∥∥ < ǫ. We call i ǫ-intelligent, if i is intelligent for all topics
Xk.
This definition captures the idea that an agent’s initial beliefs, which we think of as not influenced
by peers (or their beliefs), express something innate to agent i, his hidden ability or, simply, intelligence.
However, we say nothing here on how i has arrived at his initial beliefs, e.g., whether it was through
hidden ability in a proper sense or, for instance, ‘merely’ through guessing. We also remark that the
concept of ǫ-intelligence (or ǫ-wisdom, as we define below) is clearly related to our weight adjustment
rule; in particular, for given tolerance η, agents increase their weight for an agent j if this agent is
ǫ-intelligent (or ǫ-wise) for a topic Xk and for all ǫ ≤ η.
When i is ‘close to truth’ in the limit of the DeGroot learning process, we call i wise.
Definition 5.2. We call an agent i ǫ-wise for (topic) Xk if i’s limit belief on Xk is ‘close to truth’, i.e.,∥∥bki (∞)− µk∥∥ < ǫ. We call i ǫ-wise, if i is wise for all topics Xk.
We also introduce stochastic analogues of the above definitions. If an agent has initial beliefs stochas-
tically centered around truth for a topic, we call the agent stochastically intelligent for this topic.
Definition 5.3. We call an agent i stochastically intelligent for (topic) Xk if i’s initial belief on Xk is
‘stochastically centered around truth’, i.e., bki (0) = µk + σik, where σik is some individual and topic-
specific white-noise variable. We call i stochastically intelligent, if i is stochastically intelligent for all
topics Xk.
We omit the corresponding definition for wisdom since we rarely make use of a concept of ‘stochastic
wisdom’ in the remainder of this work.
Next, fix a level of intelligence or wisdom ǫ ≥ 0. For convenience, let us denote the open ǫ-interval
around truth, within with agents are considered ǫ-intelligent (or ǫ-wise), by Bk,ǫ and its complement by
Bck,ǫ. Formally, we have:
Definition 5.4.
Bk,ǫ := (−µk − ǫ, µk + ǫ),
Bck,ǫ = S\Bk,ǫ.
Below, in the main sections of our work, our principal modeling perspective — although we may
occasionally deviate from or slightly generalize this perspective — is the notion of two groups of agents,
N1 and N2 with N1 ∪N2 = [n] and N1 ∩N2 = ∅, one of whose initial beliefs are unbiased — group N1’s
— and the other’s initial beliefs are biased, whereby we define bias as
βi,k =
∥∥E[bki (0)]− µk∥∥ .
Hence, for members i of N1, we assume that βi,k = 0 and for members i of N2, we assume that βi,k > 0
for all topics Xk. In addition, we think of the two groups of agents as having independent and identical
distributions of initial beliefs, with distribution functions FNl,k(A) = Pr[b
k
i (0) ∈ A], for l = 1, 2 and
A ⊆ S, where, of course, identical distribution refers to within group and independence refers to both
within and across group relations. Finally, for fixed level of tolerance η ≥ 0, we assume that FNl,k(Bk,η)
does not depend upon k, that is, FNl,k(Bk,η) = FNl,k′(Bk′,η), for all k, k
′. This means that agents’
probability of being within an η-interval around truth — for initial beliefs — is the same across topics.
This assumption is very similar, in spirit, to Assumption 4.5 and captures predictability of agents. We
also think of this invariant probability as denoting an agent’s ability or reliability.
To conclude this section, we introduce notation regarding convergence (and consensus) of our en-
dogenous opinion dynamics paradigm.
Definition 5.5. Let k ≥ 1 be arbitrary. We say that W(k) is convergent for opinion vector b(0) ∈ Sn
if limt→∞(W
(k))tb(0) exists. Moreover, we say that W(k) induces a consensus for opinion vector b(0)
if W(k) is convergent for b(0) and limt→∞(W
(k))tb(0) is a consensus, that is, a vector c ∈ Sn with all
entries identical.
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Rather than saying that W(k) converges, we may occasionally also say that beliefs converge (under
W(k)) or that our DeGroot learning / opinion dynamics paradigm converges. We also mention that we
typically assume matrixW(1) to be the n×n identity matrix (in the absence of further information, agents
follow their own signals), which sometimes facilitates analytical derivations, but we also consider more
general forms of the matrix W(1), where we find that such a generalization is worthwhile mentioning.
Throughout our work, we assume that weight matrices W(k) are row-stochastic, that is,
n∑
j=1
[W(k)]ij = 1,
for all i ∈ [n]. We denote the entries of an arbitrary matrix A by Aij or [A]ij . We denote by In the n×n
identity matrix and by 1n the vector of n 1’s, i.e., 1n = (1, . . . , 1)
⊺. We may omit the dimensionality if
it is clear from the context.
6 The standard DeGroot model
In the subsequent sections, we derive a few results regarding the standard DeGroot learning model under
our endogenous weight formation paradigm. First, we show that, in our setup, agents almost always
reach a consensus (Proposition 6.1 and the subsequent remark), that is, for almost all topics Xk, under
very mild conditions. Then, in Section 6.1, we show that if agents are unbiased and receive initial belief
signals that are centered around truth, then agents’ beliefs converge to truth for topics Xk, as n, k→∞,
irrespective of whether agents adjust weights based on limiting or on initial beliefs. Next, in Section 6.2,
we illustrate that agents may be arbitrarily far off from truth as the number of biased agents involved
in the opinion dynamics process becomes large, thus demonstrating that crowd wisdom may fail under
these circumstances. For the situation when T (n) = 0, we also give sufficient conditions on when crowd
wisdom does not fail, even under the presence of biased agents. In Section 6.3, we discuss weights on own
beliefs as a (simple) extension of the classical DeGroot learning paradigm and as discussed by DeMarzo,
Vayanos, and Zwiebel (2003) [25].
We start our discussion with a theorem given in the original DeGroot paper [24], which helps us
determining when our endogenous opinion dynamics process leads agents to a consensus.
Theorem 6.1. If there exists a positive integer t such that every element in at least one column of the
matrix Wt is positive, then W induces a consensus for any vector b(0) ∈ Sn.
Theorem 6.1 can be used in a straightforward manner to derive conditions, in our setup, under
which agents reach a consensus. Namely, during the course of dicussing issues X1, X2, X3, . . ., as long
as no agent has been η-intelligent (resp. η-wise), agents do not adjust their weights to other agents,
and, consequently, agents reach a consensus if and only if W(1) induces a consensus. At the first time
point that some agent has been η-intelligent (resp. η-wise), all agents subsequently adjust weights for
this agent, and, hence, (at least) one column of the respective weight matrix is strictly positive for the
subsequent topic. Hence, for this topic, all agents reach a consensus. But note that this column remains
positive for all weight matrices corresponding to discussion topics discussed thereafter (as can easily be
shown inductively) because even redistribution of weight mass to other agents, via weight normalization,
cannot make a matrix entry zero once it has been positive. Now, we formalize these simple ideas. Then,
we generalize to the setting when agents have individualized tolerances ηi.
Let Ai be the set of time points agent i is η-intelligent (resp. η-wise) for some topic Xk,
Ai = {k ∈ N |
∥∥bki (τ) − µk∥∥ < η} ⊆ N,
where τ = 0 (resp. τ =∞) and let ai be the first time that i is η-intelligent for some topic Xk,
ai = minAi.
Then, we have the following proposition, for which we assume that T (·) > 0 on its whole domain. This
assumption is innocuous here; if it does not hold, the proposition may easily be adjusted to account for
the different setup.
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Proposition 6.1. Let η ≥ 0 be fixed. Let τ = 0 (resp. τ = ∞). Let r = mini∈[n] ai be the earliest
time point that some agent is η-intelligent (resp. η-wise) for topic Xr. (a) Then agents reach a consensus
for all topics Xk with k > r, independent of their initial beliefs. (b) For topics 1, . . . , r, agents reach a
consensus if and only if W(1) induces a consensus.
Proof. (a) By the proposition, we know that some agent i is η-intelligent (resp. η-wise) for topic Xr.
Accordingly, agents increase their weight to i by δ ·T (·) > 0 at time r+1. Hence, weight matrixW(r+1)
has a strictly positive column and so do, in general, have all matrices W(k), for k > r. By Theorem 6.1,
agents thus reach a consensus for all issues Xk, with k > r.
(b) For issues X1, . . . , Xr, no weight adjustments are made, whence W
(1) = · · · = W(r) and a
consensus is reached if and only if W(1) induces a consensus.
Remark 6.1. Assume, for the moment, that agents have individualized tolerances ηi. Then part (a) of
Proposition 6.1 is true if we replace Ai as above by
Ai = {k ∈ N |
∥∥bki (τ) − µk∥∥ < min
j∈[n]
ηj},
and we define ai as above as ai = minAi.
Remark 6.2. Consider τ = 0 for this remark. If initial beliefs are random variables, then r, as specified
in Proposition 6.1, is a random variable (which we could consider a ‘stopping time’). Accordingly, its
distribution might be of interest. Assuming agent i’s initial opinions for each topic Xk to be distributed
with distribution function Fi,k, that is, P [b
k
i (0) ∈ A] = Fi,k(A), for A ⊆ S, we have that the probability
that at least one agent i is η-intelligent for topic Xk is given by pk,η = 1 −
∏
i∈[n] Fi,k(B
c
k,η), due to
independence of agents’ initial beliefs. Then, if Fi,k(B
c
k,η) does not depend on Xk but only on η, we have
that r has a geometric distribution with probability pη (where we omit, in the notation, the dependence
on k due to our assumption), that is,
P [r = ν] = (1 − pη)ν−1pη, for ν = 1, 2, 3, . . .
From the specification of pη, we thus see that if Fi,k(B
c
k,η) < 1 for all i, then pη → 1 as n → ∞.
Accordingly, the distribution of r converges to the degenerate distribution with P [r = 1] = 1 and
P [r 6= 1] = 0. Thus, in this situation, agents ‘almost always’ — that is, with possibly only finitely many,
namely, one, exceptions, topic X1 — reach a consensus for topics Xk, for k = 1, 2, 3, . . ..
We also find the next simple result which states that if all agents start with initial beliefs within a
precision of ǫ around truth, then agents will also end up with limiting beliefs with level of wisdom of ǫ,
provided that agents’ beliefs convergence at all, as time goes to infinity.
Proposition 6.2. Let level of intelligence ǫ ≥ 0 be fixed. If all agents are ǫ-intelligent for Xk and the
DeGroot learning process (3.1) converges, then all are ǫ-wise for topic Xk.
Proof. This simply follows from the fact that the interval Bk,ǫ = (µk − ǫ, µk + ǫ) is a convex set and
weights are always row-stochastic in our model setup. Thus, if all agents start their beliefs in Bk,ǫ, limit
beliefs will also be in Bk,ǫ, provided that they converge.
As we have seen in Proposition 6.1, whether or not the DeGroot learning process (3.1) converges on
the first r topics depends on the initial weight matrixW(1). Thereafter, convergence (even to consensus)
is guaranteed. Hence, using Proposition 6.2, we obtain:
Corollary 6.1. Let level of intelligence ǫ ≥ 0 be fixed. If all agents are ǫ-intelligent (i.e., for all topics
Xk), then all agents are ǫ-wise for all topics Xk, with k > r, where r is defined as in Proposition 6.1.
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6.1 Unbiased agents
In this setup, we assume that all agents receive initial signals
bki (0) = µk + ǫik, (6.1)
where µk is truth for issue Xk and ǫik is white noise (i.e., with mean zero and independent of other
variables) with variance σ2i = Var[ǫik] (note that we assume the variance to be independent of the issue
Xk). As throughout, we assume agents’ initial signals to be independent.
We consider first the situation when agents adjust weights based on limiting beliefs, i.e., τ =∞. In
the next proposition, we show that agents become ǫ-wise in this situation (for any ǫ > 0), in the limit as
both n, population size, and k, which indexes topics, go to infinity. The intuition behind this result is
simple: since, in our setup, agents tend toward a consensus (see Proposition 6.1), agents will generally
all be jointly η-wise (where η is agents’ tolerance) or not. Then, since agents adjust based on limiting
beliefs, agents receive the same increments (or not) to their weight structure, so that, as k becomes large,
W(k) is the matrix with entries 1
n
, approximately. Then, the law of large number implies convergence
to truth, as n becomes large, since initial beliefs are stochastically centered around truth by (6.1).
Proposition 6.3. Let η ≥ 0 be fixed. Assume that agents’ initial beliefs are centered around truth in
the form (6.1). Moreover, assume that agents initially follow their own beliefs, that is, W(1) is the n×n
identity matrix In. Finally, assume that agents adjust weights based on limiting beliefs, i.e., τ =∞. Let
T (·) > 0. Then, as k, n→∞, all agents become ǫ-wise for topics Xk, for all ǫ > 0, almost surely.
Proof. As before, let r = mini∈[n] ai be the first time point that one agent is η-intelligent for topic Xr
(which is the same as η-wise for topic Xr, as W
(1) is the n × n identity matrix, by assumption). For
simplicity, assume first that, for topic Xr, all agents are η-intelligent (and hence, η-wise); we then treat
the more general case where only some agents are η-intelligent for Xr as an analogous situation. In this
case, W(r+1) looks as follows, after weight adjustments,
W(r+1) =
1
1 + nδ˜


1 + δ˜ δ˜ . . . δ˜
δ˜ 1 + δ˜ . . . δ˜
... · · · . . . ...
δ˜ δ˜ . . . 1 + δ˜

 ,
where we let δ˜ = δ · T (·). Consider any matrix A of the form
A =


β α . . . α
α β . . . α
... . . .
. . .
...
α α . . . β

 (6.2)
such that β + (n − 1)α = 1 (that is, A is row-stochastic), with 0 < α, β < 1. In Appendix A, we show
that matrix A has one eigenvalue λ = 1, to which corresponds an eigenvector c = (c, . . . , c)⊺, and (n−1)
identical eigenvalues of absolute size smaller than 1. Moreover, since A is symmetric, it is diagonalizable
of the form A = UVU⊺, where V is a diagonal matrix that contains the eigenvalues of A on the diagonal
and U is orthonormal, that is, UU⊺ = In; without loss of generality, assume that the eigenvalues in V
are arranged by size, i.e., V11 = 1 > V22 = · · · = Vnn and the corresponding eigenvectors are located in
the respective columns of U, i.e., the first column of U is the vector c. We have
At = UVtU⊺.
As t→∞, V converges to the matrix with one entry equal to 1 and all other entries equal to zero (due
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to the eigenvalue structure of A). Thus, we then have
lim
t→∞
At =
[
c 0 . . . 0
]
U⊺ =
[
c 0 . . . 0
]


c⊺
c⊺2
...
c⊺n

 = c2

1 . . . 1... . . . ...
1 . . . 1

 ,
where c2, . . . , cn are the eigenvectors corresponding to eigenvalues λ2 to λn. Moreover, since A is row-
stochastic, At is row-stochastic for every t, and, accordingly, limtA
t is row-stochastic. Therefore c2 = 1
n
.
In other words, if each agent is η-wise for topic Xr, then for topic Xr+1, we have
br+1(∞) = lim
t→∞
(W(r+1))tbr+1(0) =

 n∑
j=1
1
n
br+1j (0)



1...
1

 =
(∑n
j=1 b
r+1
j (0)
n
)1...
1

 . (6.3)
Now, for all topics Xk, with k > r, agents reach a consensus by Proposition 6.1. Hence, agents are either
all jointly η-wise or none of them is, for all k > r. Therefore, all weight matrices W(k), for k > r, have
the form (6.2) (either all entries receive an increment of δ˜ and are then renormalized, or none receives
an increment). Hence, agents’ limiting beliefs are always weighted averages of their initial beliefs, where
the weights are 1
n
. Applying the law of large numbers then implies that agents become ǫ-wise as n→∞
for any ǫ > 0 almost surely, for all k > r.
For the more general case when not all agents are η-wise for topic Xr, one can show that agents’
limiting beliefs for topic Xr+1 are (uniform) averages of the initial beliefs of the agents who were η-wise
for Xr, rather than averages of all agents’ initial beliefs. As topics progress, either all agents are jointly
η-wise or they are not (since agents always reach a consensus for topics Xk, with k > r). Hence, since
agents adjust weights based on limiting beliefs, the entries in the weight matrices W(k) all either receive
jointly an increment of δ˜ or not (in fact, increments of δ˜ are added infinitely often, almost surely, as
k → ∞ since initial beliefs are centered around truth). Hence, W(k) tends toward a matrix with all
entries 1
n
as k →∞ and the law of large numbers takes care for almost sure convergence.
Next, we state that Proposition (6.3) holds true also if agents adjust weights based on initial beliefs.
This is understandable: if agents adjust weights based on limiting beliefs, weights converge to 1
n
as k
increases. However, this weighting structure is not optimal, as it ignores the different variances of agents’
initial beliefs, but agents’ final beliefs still converge to truth in the limit. Hence, if agents set weights
‘closer to optimality’ as they do when they adjust based on initial beliefs (cf. Section 4), they should
certainly also converge to truth. We prove the proposition more formally by referring, in Appendix A, to
results developed in Golub and Jackson (2010) [39], which generalize the ‘ordinary’ law of large numbers.
Proposition 6.4. Let η ≥ 0 be fixed. Assume that agents’ initial beliefs are centered around truth in
the form (6.1). Moreover, assume that agents initially follow their own beliefs, that is, W(1) is the n×n
identity matrix In. Finally, assume that agents adjust weights based on initial beliefs, i.e., τ = 0. Let
T (·) > 0. Then, as k, n→∞, all agents become ǫ-wise for topics Xk, for all ǫ > 0, almost surely.
6.2 Biased agents
The case T (n) = 0
In the biased agent setup, we start with the following conditions. Fix a level of wisdom ǫ > 0, with ǫ ≤ η,
agents’ tolerance. Let there be n = n1 + n2 agents, and denote by N1 and N2 the respective agent sets
such that [n] = N1 ∪ N2. The agents in N1 are ǫ-intelligent and we think of them as having unbiased
initial beliefs about any topic Xk; in particular, we think of their initial beliefs as distributed according
to µk + ǫik, where ǫik is white noise, appropriately restricted such that µk + ǫik ∈ Bk,ǫ. Conversely, let
the n2 agents in N2 have initial beliefs distributed according to a random variable Zk (that depends on
topic Xk) with distribution function FZk(A) = P [b
k
i (0) ∈ A], for A ⊆ S (in particular, agents in N2 all
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have the same distribution of initial beliefs). Assume that FZk (A) > 0 for all non-empty intervals A ⊆ S.
We think of the agents in N2 as biased in that it holds that βk = ‖E[Zk]− µk‖ > 0 for all topics Xk.
Finally, assume that T (m) > 0 for all m < n and T (n) = 0 and let W(1) be the n × n identity matrix.
For short, we will also refer to the n2 agents in N2 as ‘biased’ agents.
Our first result, concerning weight adjustment at τ = ∞, states that agents’ limiting beliefs, in
expectation, in this context will be a mixture of truth µk and E[Zk] unless no biased agent ‘guesses’
truth for topic X1, the first topic to be discussed, in which case all agents reach level of wisdom ǫ for
all topics Xk. In other words, if a biased agent is true for the initial topic X1, then agents will always
mix truth with a biased variable. That agents do not mix when no biased agent is true for X1 crucially
depends on the condition T (n) = 0. Namely, if no biased agent is close enough to truth for topic X1,
only the ǫ-intelligent agents will be, such that, for topic X2, agents only increment weights to agents in
N1; consequently, as we show, for topic X2, limiting consensus beliefs will be uniform means of these
agents’ beliefs so that all agents are ǫ-wise for X2; but, since T (n) = 0, no more weight adjustments
occur whatsoever, so that all agents are ǫ-wise for all topics Xk to come. We also remark that if agents’
limiting beliefs are mixtures of truth and a biased variable, this does not mean that agents would not be
ǫ-wise for a certain topic (which depends both on the biased agents’ bias and on ǫ); it solely means that
agents mix truth with something that distracts them away from truth.
For the proof of the result, we make use of the insight that if someone is wise (or intelligent) at a
more refined level, he is also wise (or intelligent) at a coarser level; the following lemma, which restates
this, is self-explanatory and needs no proof.
Lemma 6.1. Let 0 ≤ ǫ1 ≤ ǫ2. If an agent i is ǫ1-wise (ǫ1-intelligent) for some topic Xk, then she is also
ǫ2-wise (ǫ2-intelligent) for Xk.
In the following proposition, ǫ1 will be ǫ, the level of wisdom to be obtained, and ǫ2 will be η, agents’
tolerance.
Proposition 6.5. Let the weight adjustment time point be τ = ∞. Let tolerance η ≥ 0 be fixed and
fix a level ǫ ≥ 0 of wisdom, with ǫ ≤ η.
Under the outlined conditions, if Nη(b
1(τ), µk) contains only unbiased ǫ-intelligent agents — that
is, Nη(b
1(τ), µk) = N1 — then all agents become ǫ-wise for all topics Xk, with k > 1. If Nη(b1(τ), µk)
contains also agents from the set N2,13 then agents’ limiting beliefs, in expectation, are given by
λZ E[Zk] + λµµk, for all topics k > 1, where λZ and λµ are coefficients such that λµ =
n1
|Nη(b1(τ),µk)|
and
λZ =
|Nη(b1(τ),µk)∩N2|
|Nη(b1(τ),µk)|
so that λµ + λZ = 1.
Proof. For convenience, we consider the situation when only one agent, i = 1, is ǫ-intelligent. The more
general case is a straightforward extension of our arguments. We also assume that agent i = 1 holds
beliefs bki (0) = µk, for all k ≥ 1.
Let Nη(b
1(τ), µk) contain only ǫ-intelligent agents. Since W
(1) is the identity matrix, the limiting
beliefs of agents 1, . . . , n on topic X1 are as follows:
b11(∞) = µ1, b12(∞) = b12(0), . . . , b1n(∞) = b1n(0).
Moreover, since initial beliefs of the agents in N2 are in Bck,η, the agents in N2 are, consequently, also
not η-wise for topic X1, in contrast to the ǫ-intelligent agent, who is η-wise for topic X1. Thus, the
weight structure at the beginnning of discussion of topic X2 looks as follows, after weight adjustment
and renormalization
W(2) =
1
1 + δ˜


1 0 0 · · · 0
δ˜ 1 0 · · · 0
... · · · . . .
δ˜ 0 0 · · · 1

 ;
13But not all of them. If Nη(b1(τ), µk) = [n], then the set Nη(b
1(τ), µk) should be replaced by Nη(b
2(τ), µk), etc.
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recall our convention that δ˜ = δ · T (·). Limiting beliefs for topic X2 are thus given by
b2(∞) = lim
t→∞
(W(2))tb2(0),
where the initial belief vector b2(0) is (µ2, b
2
2(0), . . . , b
2
n(0))
⊺. It is not difficult to see that powers of any
matrix with structure


1 0 0 · · · 0
α 1− α 0 · · · 0
... · · · . . .
α 0 0 · · · 1− α

 have the form


1 0 0 · · · 0
α 1− α 0 · · · 0
... · · · . . .
α 0 0 · · · 1− α


t
=


1 0 0 · · · 0
α
∑t−1
i=1(1− α)i (1 − α)t 0 · · · 0
... · · · . . .
α
∑t−1
i=1(1− α)i 0 0 · · · (1− α)t

 .
For 0 < α ≤ 1, the right-hand side of the last equation obviously converges to the matrix with all entries
identical to zero, except for the first column, which consists of n entries 1. Hence, by this fact, b2(∞) is the
vector with all entries µ2 and all agents are, consequently, ǫ-wise for topic X2, and, thus, also η-wise (by
Lemma 6.1). Since in this case, it holds that
∣∣Nη(b2(∞), µ2)∣∣ = n, we have T (∣∣Nη(b2(∞), µ2)∣∣) = 0 by
assumption, so that agents do not adjust weights for topic X3 (more precisely, the adjustment increment
is zero). Hence,W(3) =W(2), and agents will also be ǫ-wise for topic X3 since agent i = 1 is ǫ-intelligent
for X3. Inductively, this holds for all Xk, with k > 1.
Now, assume that at least one agent in N2 happens to know truth for topic X1 (that is, his initial
belief is within an η radius of truth), which may always occur since FZk(A) > 0 for all intervals A ⊆ S
by assumption. For convenience, we assume that exactly one agent in N2, say, agent 2, happens to know
truth for topic X1. Then, at the beginning of the discussion of topic X2, agents increase their weights
for agents 1 and 2, resulting in the following structure:
W(2) =
1
1 + 2δ˜


1 + δ˜ δ˜ 0 0 · · · 0
δ˜ 1 + δ˜ 0 0 · · · 0
δ˜ δ˜ 1 0 · · · 0
...
... · · · . . .
δ˜ δ˜ 0 0 · · · 1


Again, limiting beliefs for topic X2 are then given by
b2(∞) = lim
t→∞
(
W(2)
)t
b2(0).
It is not difficult to see that powers of matrices with structures as in the given W(2) converge to the
matrix with the first two columns being 121n and the remaining columns are zero vectors. Thus, limiting
beliefs of all agents are just the average of the first two agents’ initial beliefs. This implies a limiting
consensus such that all agents are either jointly η-wise or not η-wise for topic X2. If all are η-wise, no
weight adjustments occur for topic X3 (since T (n) = 0), but if they are not η-wise, no weight adjustments
occur as well (no one was right). Thus, as before, W(2) = W(3) = W(4) = · · · , such that for all topics
to come, limiting beliefs of all agents will always be averages of the first agent’s (who is ǫ-intelligent)
and the second agent’s (who was just lucky for topic X1) initial beliefs. Hence, in expectation, agents’
limiting (consensus) beliefs will be
1
2
E[Zk] +
1
2
µk.
The more general forms of λZ and λµ can be straightforwardly derived in an analogous manner in the
more general setting.
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Figure 4: Description in text; also τ = ∞, δ = 0.2 and T (m) = 1 for m < n and T (n) = 0. For each
topic, we plot discussion rounds t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , 20. Left: Nη(b
1(∞), µ1) = {1} = N1 (ǫ-intelligent agent
in red) such that all agents are ǫ-wise for all topics Xk, with k > 1. Right: Nη(b
1(∞), µ1) = {1, 2}
contains also one biased agent (in green) such that limiting beliefs of agents are mixtures of truth and
Zk.
Example 6.1. We illustrate Proposition 6.5 in Figure 4, where we let S = [0, 1], µk = 0 for all k ≥ 1,
[n] = {1, . . . , 50}, N1 = {1} and FZk is the random uniform distribution on S, ǫ = 0 and η = 0.2.
Remark 6.3. As an application of Proposition 6.5, consider the situation when the number n of agents
goes to infinity. Then, if the fraction n2
n
of agents in N2 converges to zero, agents become ǫ-wise, in the
limit, as n→ ∞. Namely, first, the coefficient λZ converges to zero in this case since λZ ≤ n2n1 = n2n−n2 ,
so that agents’ expected consensus is indeed µk as n → ∞. Moreover, not only do agents’ limiting
beliefs converge to µk in expectation, but agents become indeed ǫ-wise in the limit, as the support of the
distribution of the ǫ-intelligent agents’ initial beliefs is Bk,ǫ.
As examples of n2
n
converging to zero, of course, if the number n2 remains constant as n → 0, then
n2
n
goes to zero. But even if, for example, n2 grows as in
√
n, all agents finally become ǫ-wise.
Proposition 6.5 may be restated in the following way; agents’ limiting beliefs, in expectation, are
given by λZ E[Zk] + λµµk, where λZ = 0 if Nη(b
1(0), µk) = N1. We can then determine the probability
that λZ = 0.
Corollary 6.2. Under the conditions of Proposition 6.5, with probability exactly FZk(B
c
k,η)
n2 > 0, we
have λZ = 0.
Proof. The event that the n2 biased agents’ initial beliefs b
1
i (0) are in B
c
k,η is, by the iid property,
FZk(B
c
k,η)
n2 .
Remark 6.4. According to the corollary, the probability that λZ = 0 is strictly positive but decreasing
as the number of biased agents increases. Hence, as n2 becomes large, agents’ limiting beliefs are very
likely mixtures of truth µk and E[Zk], a value that is different from truth.
Remark 6.5. We may consider the setup of Proposition 6.5 as a ‘type inference’ problem. What the
proposition says and shows is that, since agents adjust their weights based on limiting beliefs, they cannot
infer the intelligent agents once a biased non-intelligent agent has guessed truth because agents always
reach a consensus in our situation (cf. also Proposition 6.1). Thus, the intelligent agents cannot properly
signal their type in this case because all agents’ limiting beliefs are indistinguishable.
Now, consider the exact same situation as in Proposition 6.5, except that agents adjust weights based
on initial beliefs, i.e., τ = 0. In this situation, a sufficient condition for wisdom is that agents find truth
sufficiently valuable, i.e., δ is sufficiently large. In this case, wisdom, in the limit as k → ∞, obtains
almost surely, namely, all that is required is that only the ǫ-intelligent agents in N1 are initially true for
some topic Xk.
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Figure 5: Description in text; also τ = 0, δ = 100 and T (m) = 1 for m < n and T (n) = 0. For each
topic, we plot discussion rounds t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , 5. For topic M = 5, we have Nη(b
M (0), µM ) = N1 such
that all agents are ǫ-wise for all topics Xk, with k > M .
Proposition 6.6. Let the weight adjustment time point be τ = 0.
Under the conditions as in Proposition 6.5, if δ is sufficiently large, then, almost surely, there exists
a (time point) M ∈ N such that all agents are ǫ-wise for all topics Xk, with k > M .
Proof. Let M be the first time point that (1) only ǫ-intelligent agents in N1 happen to know truth,
initially, for topic XM , that is, b
M
i (0) ∈ Bk,η for all i ∈ N1 and no i ∈ N2; and, (2) not all agents are
η-wise for XM (such that T (·) > 0). Then, weight adjustment at M + 1 will add δ˜ > 0 to the weights
of the ǫ-intelligent agents in N1. If δ˜ is sufficiently large, after normalization, weights for the non-
intelligent agents become arbitrarily small and (arbitrarily close to) uniform for the ǫ-intelligent agents.
In particular, δ may be so large that all agents’ beliefs bM+1i (1) lie in Bk,ǫ. Since this is a convex set and
weight matrices are row-stochastic, beliefs will remain in Bk,ǫ for all time periods t; hence, agents will be
ǫ-wise in the limit for topic XM+1, and, consequently, also η-wise. Since T (n) = 0, no more adjustments
will occur after time point M +1 and all agents become ǫ-wise for all topics Xk, with k > M , since their
weights are now (sufficiently close to) uniform for the ǫ-intelligent agents in N1.
Example 6.2. We illustrate Proposition 6.6 in Figure 5, where we let S = [0, 1], µk = 0 for all k ≥ 1,
[n] = {1, . . . , 50}, N1 = {1} and FZk is the random uniform distribution on S, ǫ = 0 and η = 0.05.
Remark 6.6. To summarize, the intelligent agents in N1 can now correctly signal their type. All that
is required is that only ǫ-intelligent agents in N1 happen to know truth for some topic, in which case
they will receive such a large weight increment that they lead society to ǫ-wisdom; then, no more weight
adjustments occur because the ‘right guys’ have been identified.
Remark 6.7. In our current setup, the difference between weight adjustment at τ = 0 vs. at τ =∞ is
as follows. While adjusting at τ = 0 leads agents to ǫ-wisdom almost surely provided that they find truth
sufficiently valuable, that is, δ is large enough; updating at τ = ∞ leads agents to ǫ-wisdom provided
that biased agents do not know (or, perhaps, ‘guess’) truth for topic X1. The latter condition is difficult
to satisfy if we assume that the number of biased agents becomes large, while the condition of sufficiently
large δ also depends on population size n and, in particular, on n2, the population size of the biased
agents. In other words, if T (n) = 0, we can specify sufficient conditions for wisdom even under the
presence of biased agents, but these are rather challenging.
The case T (·) > 0
Now, we consider the same setup as in the last subsection, except that we assume that T (·) > 0 on
its whole domain. In this case, agents continuously adjust their weights to other agents, which is also
the rational behavior of an agent who assumes the conditions outlined in Section 4; recall our previous
discussion.
We consider a slightly more general situation here than in the last subsection in that we allow each
agent to have initial beliefs distributed according to individualized distribution functions, rather than to
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assume groups with identical distribution functions; the more restrictive setting is then a special case of
our generalization. Accordingly, assume that agent i’s initial belief for topic Xk is distributed according
to random variable Zi,k with distribution function Fi,k(A) = Pr[Zi,k ∈ A] for all A ⊆ S and all topics
Xk, for k ∈ N. We assume that Fi,k(Bk,η), which gives the probability that agent i is within an η-radius
around truth µk, does not depend on topic Xk, that is, Fi,k(Bk,η) = Fi,k′ (Bη,k′) for all k, k
′, which
means that the probability that agent i is truthful is the same across topics. We then have the following
proposition.
Proposition 6.7. Let tolerance η ≥ 0 be fixed. Assume that agents adjust weights based on initial
beliefs, i.e., τ = 0, and assume that T (·) > 0. Then, as k → ∞, agents’ limiting consensus beliefs on
issue Xk are distributed according to
bki (∞) ∼
n∑
j=1
λjZj,k
where
λj ∝ Fj,k(Bk,η)
with
∑n
j=1 λj = 1 (note that λj does not depend upon k by assumption). In particular, we have
E[bki (∞)] =
n∑
j=1
λj E[Zj,k].
Proof. Our proof is not rigorous.
Since agents are homogenous with respect to tolerance η, they will all jointly increase their weight
to a particular agent j (or they will jointly not do so). Therefore, as k increases, rows of W(k) become
more and more similar, independent of the initial conditions W(1) (if weight matrix W(1) is identical
in each row, this will propagate to any W(k) with k > 1, but even if not, rows will become more and
more similar by the homogeneity of agents). The weight mass that any particular agent i assigns to
any particular agent j is clearly proportional to Fj,k(Bk,η) (cf. Figure 1) since this value indicates how
frequently agent j is truthful. Hence, since rows of W(k) are (approximately) identical, as k becomes
large, with each entry [W(k)]ij being proportional to Fj,k(Bk,η), limiting beliefs of agents are given by,
bki (∞) ≅ bki (1) =
n∑
j=1
λjb
k
j (0),
where λj ∝ Fj,k(Bk,η). This completes the proof.
Remark 6.8. The coefficients λj have a very intuitive interpretation. Since they indicate how limiting
consensus beliefs are formed in terms of initial beliefs, their standard interpretation is that of social
influence weights (cf., e.g., Golub and Jackson (2010) [39]). Clearly, in our endogenous weight formation
model, with weight sizes dependent upon ‘past performance’, an agent’s social influence is intuitively
given by his likelihood of correctly predicting truth.
Example 6.3. Considering the distribution of limiting consensus beliefs, we note that if two Zj,k,
for j = x, y, are normally distributed with parameters (µkx, σ
2
x,k) and (µ
k
y , σ
2
y,k), then both λjZj,k as
well as
∑
j λjZj,k are normally distributed; the latter sum has normal distribution with parameters
(λxµ
k
x + λyµ
k
y , σ
2
x,k + σ
2
y,k). Hence, if all agents’ initial beliefs are normally distributed, their limiting
beliefs are also normally distributed.
Moreover, if there are several ‘types’ or ‘groups’ of agents, N1, . . . ,Nm, of sizes n1, . . . , nm, where each
group has identical and independent initial distribution (within groups), then agents in each group receive
about the same weight mass, which is proportional to (see example below) λNl
1
nl
, for l ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, so
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that if sizes n1, . . . , nm of groups become large, then, by the central limit theorem,
∑
j∈Nl
λNl
1
nl
Zj,k =
is approximately normally distributed. Thus, by our above remark,
∑
j∈[n] λjZj,k is also approximately
normally distributed. In other words, we would generally expect agents’ limiting beliefs to be normally
distributed, in this setup.
Example 6.4. Consider three groups of agents, N1,N2,N3 ⊆ [n] with N1∪N2∪N3 = [n] and where the
Nl’s are pairwise mutually disjoint. The first group, which we call experts, has initial beliefs distributed
according to N(µk, σ
2
1), where σ
2
1 > 0 is fixed (that is, each member in N1 has the given distribution
function, and we assume members’ initial beliefs to be independent). The second and third groups
are biased. Assume, for illustration, that group two has distribution N(µk − a, σ22) and group three
has N(µk + b, σ
2
3). Assume the groups have sizes n1 =
1
5n, and n2 = n3 =
2
5n, that is, the group
of experts is smallest in size (but still growing in n). Moreover, let, for instance, a = 3, b = 1 and
σ21 = σ
2
2 = σ
2
3 = 1, and let η = 0.25. Then, each expert has λj of about λj ∝ 0.19741, members of
group two have λj ∝ 0.0024 and members of group three have λj ∝ 0.0278. Since the λ’s must sum
to one, we have about λN1 ≅
0.19751n1
C0
for experts, and λN2 ≅
0.0024n2
C0
and λN3 ≅
0.0278n3
C0
for groups
two and three, respectively, and where C0 = λN1 + λN2 + λN3 and λNl =
∑
j∈Nl
λj for l = 1, 2, 3. For
n = 100, this is about λN1 ≅ 0.44, λN2 ≅ 0.01, and λN3 ≅ 0.55, which is also, approximately, the limiting
structure of the distribution of λ as n→∞. Hence, in the limit, as n→∞, these agents beliefs’ would
converge to a consensus that is off by about λN1 ·0+λN2 · (−3)+λN3 ·1 = 0.51227 from truths µk. More
precisely, the agents’ limiting consensus values are distributed according to a normal distribution with
mean µk+0.51227 and variance that converges to zero in n; in particular, variance of limiting consensus
values is given by
σ21
n1
+
σ22
n2
+
σ23
n3
, which is 110 for our example. We plot the (predicted and theoretical)
limiting distribution of bki (∞) and a sample histogram from an actual simulation in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Left: The distribution function of three groups of agents as discussed in Example 6.4; experts’
initial beliefs are always centered around truth, for all topics Xk, while there are two biased groups,
one which underestimates truth and one which overestimates truth. If the relative sizes of groups are as
described in the text, agents distribution of limiting beliefs, as k becomes large, is given by the high-peak
normal distribution indicated, whose mean is off from truth by about 0.5. Right: Sample distribution
from a simulation vs. predicted distribution according to Proposition 6.7.
In the next proposition, we discuss weight adjustment based on limiting beliefs. We assume that
Fi,k(A) > 0 for all non-empty intervals A ⊆ S.
Proposition 6.8. Let tolerance η ≥ 0 be fixed. Assume that agents adjust weights based on limiting
beliefs, i.e., τ = ∞, and assume that T (·) > 0. Then, as k → ∞, agents’ limiting consensus beliefs on
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issue Xk are distributed according to
bki (∞) ∼
n∑
j=1
1
n
Zj,k
In particular, we have
E[bki (∞)] =
n∑
j=1
1
n
E[Zj,k].
Proof. Since agents reach a consensus for topics Xk, with k > r, and agents adjust weights based on
limiting beliefs, weight matrix entries for all agents converge to 1
n
. Convergence to 1
n
is assured since
all agents have Fi,k(Bk,η) > 0 by assumption such that the probability that agents’ limiting consensus
is within an η-interval around truth is at least Fi,k(Bk,η)
n > 0, from which it follows that agents adjust
weights infinitely often (which each time entails an increment of δ˜ and, thus, implies convergence of
weight matrix entries to 1
n
) with probability 1.
Remark 6.9. We see here, again, that adjusting based on limiting beliefs is ‘worse’ than adjusting based
on initial beliefs, since limiting beliefs are formed through social interaction and may thus not indicate
the inherent ‘intelligence’ of an agent.
To quantify the difference by way of illustration, in Example 6.4, agents’ beliefs would now converge
to a consensus, as k → ∞, that is off from truths by about n1
n
· 0 + n2
n
· (−3) + n3
n
· 1 = − 45 , which is
further away than the value of about 0.51 given in the situation when agents adjust weights based on
initial beliefs. In particular, agents in group N2, who are very poor at estimating truth, now receive
much larger social influence than in the situation where agents adjust based on initial beliefs.
However, qualitatively, the results do not change (by much): in both circumstances, τ = 0 and
τ = ∞, agents’ limiting beliefs, under our endogenous weight adjustment process, are given by convex
combinations of all agents’ initial beliefs, whereby adjusting based on initial beliefs captures, in the social
influence weights λj , the intelligence of agents while adjusting based on limiting beliefs leads agents to
uniform social influence weights λj .
Now, consider, again, the setup where there are two groups of agents, which we denote by N1 and
N2, respectively; the first groups’ initial beliefs are unbiased while the second groups’ initial beliefs are
biased, where we assume that agents within each group have independently and identically distributed
initial beliefs. Assume, furthermore, that Fi,k(Bk,η) > 0 for all agents i = 1, . . . , n.
Corollary 6.3. Let τ = 0 or τ =∞ and let η ≥ 0, the radius within which agents are considered to be
truthful, be fixed. Then, if the group of biased agents N2 is ‘large enough’ (e.g., relative to N1), agents
will not become ǫ-wise almost surely as n, k → ∞, for any ǫ ∈ (0, ‖µk − E[ZN2,k]‖), whereby ZN2,k
denotes a random variable that represents the distribution of initial beliefs of any agent from group N2.
Proof. By Proposition 6.7 and its proof, if τ = 0, λNl =
∑
j∈Nl
λj ≅
FNl,k(Bk,η)nl
C0
as k → ∞ (by FNl,k,
we denote the distribution function of an agent from group Nl; also note that FNl,k(Bk,η) does not
depend on k by assumption), where l = 1, 2 and C0 = λN1 + λN2 . Thus, if n2 is large enough (relative
to n1), λN2 be may arbitrarily close to 1 such that, in expectation, agents’ limiting consensus belief will
be arbitrarily close to E[ZN2,k], whereby, by assumption, ZN2,k is a biased variable. As n→∞, limiting
beliefs will converge to E[ZN2,k] almost surely, in this case, by the law of large numbers.
If τ =∞, Proposition 6.8 leads to the same conclusion.
Remark 6.10. What Corollary 6.3 shows is that agents may not become infinitely wise under our
endogenous weight adjustment process if the group of agents with biased initial beliefs becomes large,
as, in this case, this group’s social influence will become arbitrarily large. But the corollary shows
more: agents may not become ǫ-wise for any ǫ ∈ (0, ‖µk − E[ZN2,k]‖), which may be an arbitrarily large
interval, depending on the bias of the agents in N2. In other words, if the number of biased agents is
large (relative to the number of intelligent agents), the wisdom that society as a whole can attain is
limited by the latter agents’ bias.
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6.3 Varying weights on own beliefs
DeMarzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel (2003) [25] consider a slight generalization of belief updating process
(3.1) where agents may place varying weights on their own beliefs such that (3.1) reads as
bk(t+ 1) =
(
(1− λt)In + λtW(k)
)
bk(t) (6.4)
whereby 0 < λt ≤ 1 (note that we treat λt as an exogenous variable). Such a weighting scheme may
be empirically plausible, as it has been found (cf., e.g., Mannes (2009) [64]) that people often tend
to overweight their own beliefs relative to that of outsiders, probably because individuals have access
to their own motivations for beliefs while they do not have such justification for others’ beliefs. This
reasoning would imply that λt is ‘relatively small’. However, as long as weights on others’ beliefs do
not drop to zero too quickly, belief updating rule (6.4) leads to the same limiting beliefs as the original
DeGroot updating rule (3.1) where λt = 1, for all t, provided that the latter converges; convergence may
take sufficiently longer, however. Hence, under these circumstances, all our previous results remain valid.
The following proposition is a straightforward generalization of the corresponding theorem, Theorem 1,
in DeMarzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel (2003) [25], which restates the lessons we have just mentioned.
Proposition 6.9. Assume thatW(k) converges (for all initial belief vectors b(0)), then if,
∑∞
t=1 λt =∞,
updating process (6.4) also converges (for all initial belief vectors b(0)) and leads to the same limiting
beliefs as (3.1) where λt = 1 for all t.
We list the proof in the appendix.
In all subsequent sections, we only discuss the situations when τ = 0 and T (·) > 0, as the other cases
may be derived in a manner similar to what we have sketched in this section.
7 Opposition
In this section, we consider the situation when two subsets of agents ‘oppose’ each other. Such opposi-
tion may derive, for example, from in-group vs. out-group antagonisms, as is an important concept in
psychology and sociology (cf. Brewer (1979) [12], Castano, Yzerbyt, Bourguignon, and Seron (2002) [18],
Kitts (2006) [53]) and as has also more recently been taken into account in economics models (cf., in
an experimental context, e.g., Charness, Rigotti, and Rustichini (2007) [20], Fehrler and Kosfeld (2013)
[32]) and in social network theory (cf. Beasley and Kleinberg (2010) [10]). Prime exemplars of opposition
forces can be found in politics (e.g., democrats vs. republicans; opposition parties vs. governing party
in charge), for example, or also on a more global societal level (e.g., punks or hippies/counterculture vs.
mainstream culture). In the context of (DeGroot-like) opinion dynamics models, opposition has, promi-
nently, been discussed in Eger (2013) [30] (but see also our discussion in Section 2), whose modeling we
relate to.
In the model of Eger (2013) [30], there are two types of links between agents. One link type refers to
whether agents follow or oppose each other and the other link type denotes the intensity of relationship
and is given by a non-negative real number Wij ∈ R. Belief updating is then performed via the operation
bk(t+ 1) = (W(k) ◦ F(k))bk(t), (7.1)
whereby the operator W(k) ◦ F(k) is defined via
(
(W(k) ◦ F(k))(b))
i
=
n∑
j=1
W
(k)
ij F
(k)
ij (bj),
whereby F
(k)
ij ∈ {F,D}, where F : S → S is the identity function (‘agent i follows agent j’) andD : S → S
is an opposition function (‘agent i opposes/deviates from agent j’). In other words, in this model, agents
28
12
3
4
5
6
7
Figure 7: Illustration of an opposition bipartite operator F (agent nodes as blue circles). For convenience,
D relationships are indicated in red, and F relationships in green. Here, we draw the network of agents
as undirected, although we generally allow directed links between agents.
form their current beliefs by inverting (via D) or not (‘via F ’) the past belief signals of others and then
taking a weighted arithmetic average, as in standard DeGroot learning, of the so modified (or not) belief
signals of their neighbors. As becomes evident, endogenizing this model would require endogenizing two
variables, namely, F
(k)
ij andW
(k)
ij , a task that is beyond the scope of this section. Therefore, we take F
(k)
ij
as exogenous and keep, as before, W
(k)
ij as an endogenous variable, formed, in the case that Fij = F , by
reference to an agent’s past performance.14
Hence, we consider the following situation. Denote by A ⊆ [n] and B ⊆ [n] the two groups of agents
that oppose each other. We posit that F is opposition bipartite (cf. Figure 7): for all agents i, i′ ∈ A
it holds that Fii′ = Fi′i = F (analogously for B) and for all agents i ∈ A and i′ ∈ B it holds that
Fii′ = Fi′i = D, which simply means that agents within the two groups follow each other whereas
agents across the two groups oppose each other.15 Next, we assume that, regarding weight adjustments,
members of both groups ignore members of the other group (a sin or bias of omission), taking into
account only members of their own group, that is,
W
(k+1)
ij =
{
W
(k)
ij + δ · T (
∣∣N(bk(τ), µk)∣∣) if ∥∥bkj (τ)− µk∥∥ < η and G(i) = G(j),
W
(k)
ij otherwise,
(7.2)
where G(i) denotes the group of agent i, which is either A or B; for simplicity, assume T (·) = 1, here
and in the remainder of this section. Finally, we assume that agents i of group A initially assign uniform
intensity of relationship W
(1)
ij = b to each member j of group B and members of group B do analogously,
assigning W
(1)
ij = c, where b and c are positive constants. We also assume that these levels stay fixed
over topics, that is, W
(k)
ij = W
(1)
ij whenever G(i) 6= G(j). When G(i) = G(j), as said, we let weights be
formed according to (7.2). Finally, we always assume that weight matrices W(k) are row-stochastic. We
now discuss the so specified model, with endogenous weight (or intensity) formation for at least a subset
of agents, in the following example. For opposition function D, we let D be soft opposition on S = R
(see Eger (2013) [30] for details) with the functional form D(x) = −x. We first outline the following
proposition from Eger (2013) [30], which gives conditions for convergence ofW ◦F, where we omit, here
and in the following, reference to topics Xk for notational convenience.
Proposition 7.1. Let D be soft opposition on S = R. Then, W ◦F is affine-linear with representation
(A,0). Then, if F is opposition bipartite, λ = 1 is an eigenvalue of A. If λ = 1 is the only eigenvalue of
14If Fij = D, it would make no sense, or be at least problematic, to posit that an agent would increase his intensity of
relationship, relating to opposition behavior, in proportion to another agent’s accuracy of predicting truth.
15This specificiation is not self-evident; intra-group antagonisms, based, e.g., on personalized differences between members
of the same group, might plausibly be allowable.
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A on the unit circle and if λ = 1 has algebraic multiplicity of 1, then limt→∞(W ◦F)tb(0) = p for some
polarization opinion vector p (that depends on b(0)) and all initial opinion vectors b(0) ∈ Sn.
In the proposition, a polarization opinion (or belief) vector is any vector p consisting of two beliefs
a, b ∈ S such that D(a) = b and D(b) = a. For our specification of D, this would mean that a = −b.
Hence, the proposition says that if D is soft opposition, then W ◦ F is representable by a matrix A,
and if in addition F is opposition bipartite (as we assume), then convergence of W ◦ F depends on the
eigenvalues of A. In the following example, we will make reference to the proposition.
Example 7.1. Let n1 =
∣∣A∣∣ and n2 = ∣∣B∣∣ with n1 + n2 = n. Before (partly) endogenizing W, assume
first that W and F have the following form,
W =
(
WA,A WA,B
WB,A WB,B
)
F =
(
FA,A FA,B
FB,A FB,B
)
(7.3)
where [WA,A]ij = a, [WA,B]ij = b, [WB,A]ij = c, [WB,B]ij = d, and [FA,A]ij = [FB,B]ij = F ,
[FA,B]ij = [FB,A]ij = D; matrices WA,A and FA,A are of size n1 × n1, WA,B and FA,B of size n1 × n2,
etc. Hence, agents in A follow each other, assigning weight a to each other, and agents in B assign
weight d to each other; across the two sets, agents oppose each other, with weights b and c, respectively,
as already indicated above. Moreover, for simplicity, as the given specification posits, we assume that
weights are uniform within groups and opposition weights are also uniformly distributed. Since, as
Proposition 7.1 tells, the so defined W ◦ F allows an (affine-)linear representation, this is given by, in
this setup,
A =
(
WA,A −WA,B
−WB,A WB,B
)
, (7.4)
as one can verify (cf. Eger (2013) [30]). Furthermore, if (W◦F)tb(0) = Atb(0) converges to a polarization
vector (e.g., under the conditions of Proposition 7.1), then the one limiting belief is given by
∑n
j=1 sjbj(0)
and the other is given by −∑nj=1 sjbj(0), where s = (s1, . . . , sn)⊺ is the unique eigenvector of A⊺
satisfying
∑n
j=1 |sj | = 1 and corresponding to eigenvalue λ = 1 of A⊺ (cf. Eger (2013) [30], Remark
6.4). The vector s is then a (generalized) social influence vector (cf. the concept of eigenvector centrality,
e.g., Bonacich (1972) [11]), with |si| denoting the social influence (proper) of agent i and sgn(si) his
group membership. Since, by our specification of W ◦ F, agents in group A must have the same social
influence (by homogeneity of these agents due to the uniform weight structure) as well as agents in
group B, we must accordingly have that s = (x, . . . , x︸ ︷︷ ︸
n1
, y, . . . , y︸ ︷︷ ︸
n2
)⊺ for some x, y ∈ R. Then, y (or |y|)
measures social influence of members of group B and accordingly for A. Hence, from A⊺s = s, we find
(1) n1ax−n2cy = x, (2) −n1bx+n2dy = y, and (3) n1x−n2y = 1 (from the unit condition on s). From
this, it follows that
y =
b
n2(d− b)− 1 , and x = (1 + n2y)a− n2cy. (7.5)
The case of y may serve as an illustration. Computing the comparative statics of |y| with respect to b
and d, we first find that since n2(d− b) ≤ n2d ≤ 1, it holds that y ≤ 0. Hence, |y| = b1−n2(d−b) and then,
∂ |y|
∂b
=
1− n2d(
1− n2(d− b)
)2 ≥ 0, ∂ |y|∂d = n2b(1− n2(d− b))2 > 0
such that an increase in d leads to an increase in the absolute value of y, as we would expect — if the
weight that members of group B place upon each other increases, their social influence, measured in
absolute value, increases. Moreover, |y| also increases in b — the more members of group A want to
disassociate from members of group B, the more does group B’s social influence increase, in absolute
value. We exemplify in Figure 8 (left).
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Hence, under our current assumptions, limiting polarization beliefs of agents are given by
∑
j∈[n] sjbj(0) =∑
j∈A xbj(0) +
∑
j∈B ybj(0) and −
∑
j∈[n] sjbj(0) = −
∑
j∈A xbj(0)−
∑
j∈B ybj(0), respectively. Let us,
for the moment, assume that all agents are ǫ-intelligent with ǫ = 0, that is, all agents precisely receive
truths for topics, as initial beliefs. Then, limiting beliefs are, thus,
bkA(∞) =
∑
j∈[n]
sjbj(0) = µk
(
n1x+ n2y
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=c
, and bkB(∞) = −
∑
j∈[n]
sjbj(0) = µk
(
−(n1x+ n2y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−c
)
,
respectively, where closed-form solutions of x and y are given in Equation (7.5). In Figure 8 (right), we
plot, for c = 12n and d =
1−n1c
n2
fixed, the coefficient c = n1x + n2y of limiting beliefs (and its negative,
as coefficient of the other limiting belief), as a function of b (and, hence, also of a since a = 1−n2b
n1
);
note that this coefficient denotes the ‘scaling’ of truth in the limiting beliefs, whence, if it is equal to 1,
(some) agents exactly reach truth. We observe the following: if b is very low (compared with c), i.e.,
agents in group A care little about agents in group B (at least relatively) — that is, opposition from A
to B is (relatively) low — then c is very close to 1, which means that agents in group A have limiting
beliefs very close to truth, while agents in group B hold limiting beliefs that are very close to −µk, the
‘opposite’ of truth. As b increases, c becomes smaller, approaching zero as b = c. In other words, if
opposition ‘force’ is equal between groups A and B — in the sense that b = c — then both groups reach
limiting beliefs of zero, no matter what truth is. As group A begins to oppose group B more heavily
than B opposes A, that is, b > c, group A goes further away from truth, toward opposite levels of truth
in that c becomes negative, while group B begins to approach truth.
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Figure 8: Both graphs: n = n1 + n2 = 10 + 10 = 20 agents. Left: Social influence, |y|, of agent i of
group B increases both as a function of d (b fixed), ‘within-group trust’ of members of group B, and b
(d fixed), the importance assigned to members of group B via agents of group A. Note that n2b ≤ 1
and n2d ≤ 1 (by row-stochasticity of weight matrices W), which implies, in our case, b, d ≤ 110 . Right:
c = 12n = 0.025, d =
3
2n fixed. Coefficient c = (n1x+ n2y) of µk (red) and −c (green) as a function of b.
Description in text.
Now, concerning the question whether the conditions on the eigenvalues of matrix A, stated in
Proposition 7.1, are satisfied — that is, do agents in fact converge to a polarization? — we mention that
exactly determining the spectrum of A is difficult in the current situation, for general n1 and n2, and
a, b, c, d. For n1 = 1 and n2 arbitrary (and, by symmetry hence also for n2 = 1 and n1 arbitrary), we
find, in the appendix, that A has exactly one eigenvalue, namely λ = 1, on the unit circle and whose
algebraic multiplicity is 1. Thus, in this case, by Proposition 7.1, beliefs under W ◦F indeed converge to
a polarization, as we have sketched it, and limiting beliefs have the indicated form. We strongly suspect
that this is true for arbitrary n1 and n2, but leave the derivation open.
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Finally, when would we expectW◦F to have the form (7.3), taking the form of F as exogenous? The
structure of W holds, for instance, when W(1) has the form indicated in (7.3), agents adjust weights
(to members of their own group) based on initial beliefs, τ = 0, and, e.g., ǫ = 0 (agents’ initial beliefs
are exactly µk); then all W
(k) have the form as given in (7.3). Form (7.3) also arises, in the limit,
as k becomes large, when τ = 0 and initial beliefs are stochastically centered around truth and each
agent has the same variance (namely, agents then tend to assign uniform weights to those they take into
consideration in adjusting weights; uniform weights for outgroup members have been assumed exogenous
by us, anyways). In fact, the simulations shown in Figure 9, for the latter case, show good agreement
with the analytical predictions for the situation when all agents are ǫ-intelligent, for ǫ = 0, even for small
k, indicating that W(k) has a form close to (7.3) quickly, when agents are stochastically intelligent with
identical variances.
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Figure 9: Throughout: n = n1 + n2 = 10 + 10 = 20 agents, c =
1
2n = 0.025, d =
3
2n fixed. Discussion of
10 topics; t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , 20 discussion periods shown, for each topic. Truth µk = k+5, for k = 1, . . . , 10
(black lines). In red and green: members of groups A and B, respectively. Top left: All agents receive
initial beliefs bki (0) = µk, b = 0.09 (cf. Figure 8 (right)). Top right: b
k
i (0) = µk, b = 0.0245. Bottom left:
bki (0) = µk, b = 0.0009. Bottom right: b
k
i (0) = N(µk, 4), b = 0.0009.
Remark 7.1. In Example 7.1, we have outlined conditions under which we expect, due to polarization,
at most one group of agents to become wise for topics. The conditions that we have highlighted — e.g.,
ǫ-intelligence, for ǫ = 0, or initial beliefs stochastically centered around truth whereby all agents have
identical variances — might appear quite special. We believe that similar polarization results hold for
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much more general conditions, but those outlined have the benefit of being analytically tractable more
easily while still indicating results, as we think, of a general nature.
Remark 7.2. To summarize the importance of results indicated in Example 7.1, note that in this section,
agents have been influenced by two ‘polar’ forces. On the one hand, they were attracted by truth by
their adherence to principles that potentially lead them closer to truth — e.g., weight adjustment to
those agents in their in-group that have been truthful in the past. On the other hand, agents had —
exogenously — specified antagonisms to members of another group (a sin or bias of commission), their
outgroup, which drew them toward beliefs that are different from those held by their adversaries. The
message from Example 7.1 is clear in this context: the group that has (relatively) stronger incentives to
disassociate from negative referents tendentially will drift away from truth considerably, while the group
with (relatively) weaker such incentives may still become wise (under appropriate initial conditions on
beliefs), which is an intuitive result since, for the former group, disassociation seems to be (relatively)
more critical than truth.
8 Conformity
Buechel, Hellmann, and Klo¨ßner (2013) [15] and Buechel, Hellmann, and Klo¨ßner (2012) [14]16 study a
DeGroot-like opinion dynamics model under conformity, that is, where individuals are not only informa-
tionally socially influenced by others but also normatively in that they are motivated to state opinions
that tend to fit the group norm, possibly, in order to get “utility gain[s] by simply making the same choice
as one’s reference group” (cf. Zafar 2011 [76], p. 774). A classical example of such conforming behavior is
documented in the famous study of Asch (1955) [6] where subjects wrongly judged the length of a stick
after some other, supposedly neutral, participants had given the same wrong judgment. More examples
and relevant theoretical and empirical literature, e.g., Deutsch and Gerard (1955) [26], Jones (1984)
[49], etc., on conforming behavior among human subjects are directly provided in Buechel, Hellmann,
and Klo¨ßner (2013) [15]. As we have indicated in the introduction, we may perceive of conformity to a
reference opinion, in our context, as a bias toward the beliefs of one’s reference group.
Mathematically, agents in the named model update their beliefs informationally according to the
following rule,
b(t+ 1) = Db(t) + (W −D)s(t), (8.1)
where s(t) ∈ Sn denotes the vector of stated opinions or beliefs (whose formation, as assumed, underlies
normative social pressure, as we indicate below), b(t) ∈ Sn denotes the vector of true beliefs, W is the
social network (or, ‘learning matrix’) as in the standard DeGroot model, and D denotes its diagonal.
Updating rule (8.1) says that agents form their current beliefs by taking a weighted arithmetic average
of their past true beliefs and others’ stated beliefs. Then, as concerns normative social influence, agents
are assumed to choose stated beliefs si(t) by reference to the utility maximization problem
ui(s;b) = −(1− δi)(si − bi)2 − δi(si − qi)2, (8.2)
whereby the term (si − bi)2 represents an agent’s preference for honesty (misrepresenting true opinions
may cause cognitive discomfort, cf. Festinger (1957) [33]) and the term (si − qi)2 represents preference
for conforming to a reference opinion qi. The parameter δi ∈ (−1,+1) displays the relative importance
of the preference for conformity in relation to the preference for honesty. If δi < 0, then agents have
preference for counter-conformity in that their reference group serves as a negative referent. Now,
consider that at the end of each (opinion updating) round t = 0, 1, 2, . . ., agents play a normal form
game ([n], Sn, ui(·; bi(t))). Let q = (q1, . . . , qn)⊺ and let q(t) = Qs(t) where Q is an n× n matrix that
indicates how reference opinions are formed from stated opinions; we assume that Qii = 0 for all i ∈ [n]
such that agents do not take into account their own stated opinion in reference opinion formation17 and
16Henceforth, we only relate to the more recent version of their paper, unless the difference becomes important.
17They know better anyway, by knowledge of their true opinions.
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we also assume that Q is row-stochastic. The next proposition says that the normal form game has a
unique Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 8.1. Denote by ∆ the diagonal matrix with ∆ii = δi. Then the normal form game
([n], Sn, u(·;b(t))), for u(·;b(t)) = (u1(·;b(t)), . . . , un(·;b(t))), has a unique Nash equilibrium, which is
given by
s∗(t) = (In −∆Q)−1(In −∆)b(t) = Q˜b(t).
We prove Proposition 8.1 in the appendix. The proposition is a (straightforward) extension of the
corresponding proposition, Proposition 1, in Buechel, Hellmann, and Klo¨ßner (2012) [14] in that they
choose the particular Q with Qij =
Wij
1−Wii
(Qii = 0). In the revised version of their paper, the named
authors also specify an iterative process that explains how agents reach the Nash equilibrium s∗(t) but
we omit the recapitulation of this idea, because it is rather technical and does not provide further insight
at this point.
Hence, simply assuming that agents play the Nash equilibrium s∗(t) at the end of each period t (such
that, for t+ 1, b(t) and s(t) are available), beliefs evolve according to, combining (8.1) with s∗(t),
bk(t+ 1) =M(k)bk(t),
where
M(k) = D(k) + (W(k) −D(k))Q˜(k) = D(k) + (W(k) −D(k))(I−∆(k)Q(k))−1(I−∆(k)), (8.3)
and where we also index matrices by topic indices. As becomes obvious, this model has now many
variables that can potentially be endogenized, namely, W(k), ∆(k), which summarizes the conformity
parameters, and Q(k), which summarizes how agents form reference opinions. In the following, we take
∆(k) as exogenously given and constant across topics; the elements [∆(k)]ii = δi may then be perceived
as ‘personality traits’ of individuals. For W(k), we assume the same endogenous weight formation as
before, where weight increments depend upon past performance. The matrix Q(k), we take as arbitrary
exogenous variable first, satisfying row-stochasticity and Qii = 0 as above, and specialize then in the
examples.
Our first proposition paths the way for a convergence result in our situation. It says that the property
of having a positive column propagates from W(k) to M(k) if no agent is counter-conforming.
Proposition 8.2. Let k ≥ 1 be arbitrary. Let δi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ [n] such that agents never counter-
conform. Then, if W(k) has a positive column, then so does M(k).
Proof. By the proof of Proposition 8.1, given in the appendix, the inverse of In−∆(k)Q(k) always exists
(as long as |δi| < 1, which we assume throughout) and is given by
∑∞
r=0
(
∆(k)Q(k)
)r
. Since δi ≥ 0
and since Q(k) is assumed to be row-stochastic, the latter sum is a sum of non-negative matrices and
therefore, the infinite sum yields a matrix with non-negative entries. Moreover, since A0 = In for any
arbitrary matrix A, all diagonals of
∑∞
r=0
(
∆(k)Q(k)
)r
are hence strictly positive (In has strictly positive
diagonals and the remaining summands are all non-negative). Moreover, since P := In − ∆(k) is a
diagonal matrix with each entry Pii ∈ (0, 1],
P˜ =
(
In −∆(k)Q(k)
)−1(
In −∆(k)
)
accordingly also has diagonal entries that are all strictly positive. Next, sinceW(k) has a strictly positive
column j by assumption,W(k)−D(k) has a strictly positive column j, except for element j of that column,
which is zero. Hence, multiplying, W(k)−D(k), a non-negative matrix by assumption, with P˜ results in
a matrix that also has a strictly positive column j, except possibly for its diagonal. But since D(k) has
a positive entry [D(k)]jj (since column j of W
(k) is positive by assumption),
D(k) + (W(k) −D(k))(I−∆(k)Q(k))−1(I−∆(k))
has a positive column j. The latter matrix is, by definition (Eq. 8.3), precisely the matrix M(k).
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As a corollary, we have our first convergence (to consensus) result, which provides both an alternative
to the convergence result provided in Buechel, Hellmann, and Klo¨ßner (2013) [15], and a generalization as
well as a strengthening. It is more general since it considers arbitrary Q rather than the peculiar choice
that the named authors consider. It provides an alternative since it says that conformity and a positive
column of W(k) are sufficient conditions for convergence, while the proposition in Buechel, Hellmann,
and Klo¨ßner (2013) [15] states that conformity and a positive diagonal of W(k) are sufficient conditions
for convergence. Finally, it is a strengthening because it states convergence to consensus rather than
merely convergence. Before proving the theorem, we need the following lemma which says that the rows
of M(k) sum to 1 and which we prove in the appendix.
Lemma 8.1. The matrix M(k) defined in (8.3) satisfies
M(k)1 = 1
for any row-stochastic Q.
Corollary 8.1. Let k ≥ 1 be arbitrary. Assume that δi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ [n]. Then, if W(k) has a positive
column, then M(k) induces a consensus.
Proof. First, if δi ≥ 0, then M(k) is a non-negative matrix by the proof of Proposition 8.2. Moreover, by
Lemma 8.1, M(k) is then also row-stochastic. Finally, by Proposition 8.2, ifW(k) has a positive column,
then so does M(k). A row-stochastic matrix with positive column induces a consensus by Theorem
6.1.
It might be worthwhile, in future considerations, to study in more depth which properties M(k)
inherits fromW(k), and under which conditions. As mentioned, Buechel, Hellmann, and Klo¨ßner (2013)
[15] demonstrate that M(k) inherits a positive diagonal from W(k) (under their particular choice of Q
and under conformity) as well as the general social network structure (see their discussion in their Section
4), while we show that the property of positive columns also propagates, for arbitrary Q.
For now, we contend ourselves with the fact that Corollary 8.1 implies that, as in the standard
DeGroot model, agents almost always reach a consensus — that is, for almost all topics — even under
conformity (δi ≥ 0), under very mild conditions.
Proposition 8.3. Let η ≥ 0, agents’ tolerance, be fixed. Let τ = 0 (resp. τ =∞). Let T (·) > 0. As in
Proposition 6.1, let r be the earliest time point that some agent is η-intelligent (resp. η-wise) for topic
Xr. Then, under the conformity model presented above, with δi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ [n], (a) agents reach a
consensus for all topics Xk with k > r, independent of their initial beliefs. (b) For topics 1, . . . , r, agents’
reaching a consensus depends on W(1) and on Q(1) to Q(r) as well as on ∆(1) to ∆(r).
Proof. (a) As in the corresponding proof of Proposition 6.1, W(r+1) has a positive column and so do, in
general, have all matrices W(k), for k > r. Hence, by Corollary 8.1, agents reach a consensus for topics
Xk, for k > r, under the conformity model, as long as δi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ [n]. (b) Of course, whether or
not agents reach a consensus for X1 to Xr depends on the parameters of the model.
As mentioned before, if there exist agents whose initial beliefs have positive probability of lying within
an η-interval around truths, then r, as defined in Proposition 8.3, is a finite number almost surely. For
standard parametrizations (e.g., all agents have positive probability of being truthful, for all topics), r
is very low — typically r = 1 — with probability that goes to 1 in n, population size (cf. Remark 6.2).
Example 8.1. If agents are counter-conforming, Proposition 8.3 may be false in that beliefs may even
diverge, rather than lead to a consensus. Consider, for instance,
W(r+1) =
1
1 + 2δ

1 + δ δ 0δ 1 + δ 0
δ δ 1

 ,
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Figure 10: Belief dynamics for topic Xr+1 as sketched in Example 8.1. We use δ = 5 for the weight
adjustment increment. Left: a = b = 0.1. Middle: a = b = −0.6. Right: a = b = −0.95. Throughout
c = 0.1.
which would be the resulting weight matrix if τ = 0 and agent 1’s and 2’s initial beliefs were in an
η-radius around truth, for the first time, for topic Xr. For convenience, assume that
Q(r+1) =

0 12 121
2 0
1
2
1
2
1
2 0

 , ∆ =

a 0 00 b 0
0 0 c

 ,
where −1 < a, b, c < 1. Then, sample belief dynamics for this setting are sketched in Figure 10. As
the graphs illustrate, under counter-conformity, agents may want to diassociate from others in a manner
strong enough to induce divergence.
Next, we discuss social influence of agents as a function of conformity parameters and the structure of
W(k). In particular, we show that even agents with an ‘empty record of past successes’ can be influential
in the endogenous conformity model if conformity parameters δi and matrixQ are appropriately specified.
Proposition 8.4. Let δi > 0 for all i ∈ [n]. Assume that Q is strictly positive on all off-diagonal entries.
Then, if W has at least two positive columns, M is strictly positive everywhere.
Proof. Again, M is
M = D+ (W −D)(In −∆Q)−1(In −∆).
We have R := (In −∆Q)−1 =
∑∞
r=0(∆Q)
r is strictly positive in each entry since Q is positive on all
off-diagonals and since δi > 0, whence (∆Q)
1 is positive on all off-diagonals and note that (∆Q)0 = In
has positive diagonals; the remaining terms (∆Q)r, for r ≥ 2, are non-negative. Hence, also R˜ :=
R(In −∆) > 0 entrywise, since the diagonals of (In −∆) are positive. Hence, since W has at least two
positive columns, (W −D)R˜ is also positive and then also M = D+ (W −D)R˜.
Remark 8.1. Thus, if Q is strictly positive in each entry (other than the diagonals) and all agents
are (strictly) conforming and W has at least two positive columns, then M is strictly positive in each
entry. This means that Mt is strictly positive in each entry, for all powers t ≥ 1. This also means
that limt→∞M
t, which exists for a row-stochastic M that is strongly connected and aperiodic (as an
M with strictly positive entries is), is positive in each entry. But this means that, under conformity, if
agents form their reference opinions q, to which they strive to conform, with respect to all other agents
(that is, Q is strictly positive, except for the diagonals), then each agent i has strictly positive social
influence on the limiting beliefs, even if i has never been truthful in the past. The amount of influence
(even non-truthful) agents have on limiting beliefs depends then both on past performance and on the
conformity parameters δi. We illustrate in the next example.
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Example 8.2. Assume the following situation. There are n = 3 agents and W(k) has the form
W(k) =

 12 12 01
2
1
2 0
1
2
1
2 0

 .
Such a W(k) may arise, for instance, for large k, when τ = 0 and when agents 1 and 2 have initial
beliefs centered around truth, with identical variances, and agent 3 has never been truthful, for instance,
because Pr[bk3(0) ∈ Bk,η] = 0, for all k ≥ 1. Assume that
Q(k) =

0 12 121
2 0
1
2
1
2
1
2 0

 ,
which means that everyone weighs everyone else uniformly in forming reference opinions, and assume
that Q(k) is constant across topics. Finally, let δ1 = δ2 = a and δ3 = b, where 0 < a, b < 1. Consider
the social influence of agents — that is, their influence on limiting beliefs as a function of initial beliefs.
Since agents 1 and 2 are identical, they must have the same social influence, which we denote by x ≥ 0,
and let agent 3 have influence y ≥ 0, such that 2x+y = 1. In the appendix, we show that y has the form
y =
a(1 − b)
4− ab− 3a .
Computing the comparative statics with respect to a and b, we find
∂y
∂a
=
(1− b)
(
4− ab+ 3b
)
(
4− ab− 3a
)2 > 0, ∂y∂b = a(a− 7)(
4− ab− 3a
)2 < 0.
Thus, influence of agent 3 decreases in own conformity, b, and increases in conformity of the stochastically
intelligent agents, a. Moreover, we find
lim
a→1
y = 1, lim
b→1
y = 0,
such that agent 3, who has zero probability of knowing truth, may have arbitrarily large social influence
on limiting beliefs, as long as agents 1 and 2 exhibit arbitrarily large conformity, and agent 3’s social
influence may also vanish, as his own conformity becomes arbitrarily large. In Figure 11, we plot y as
a function of a (for fixed levels of b) and b (for fixed levels of a). Note that this result, namely, that
an agent with zero probability of being truthful may become arbitrarily influential, could not have been
possible in the standard model with endogenous weight formation as we have sketched, since such an
agent’s social influence would always be zero (or converge to zero) by the results developed in Section
6, as k becomes large. This result would also not have been possible had there been only one positive
column of matrix W(k) (and the others all zero) since in this case the corresponding agent, even if he
were excessively conforming and would thus state an opinion arbitrarily close to that of his reference
group, would both ignore his own stated opinion (because he knows his true opinion) and that of others
(because all other columns are zero, by assumption) such that the agent corresponding to the positive
column would always have social influence of 1. In other words, we require at least two conforming
intelligent agents in order for a non-intelligent to be able to become influential, under our current model
specification.
To summarize, our current example shows that if conformity parameters are ‘adequately’ specified,
an agent with zero probability of being close to truth may become arbitrarily influential, which, again,
means that society may be arbitrarily far off from truth in our setup. In particular, under conformity,
society may be drawn away from truth by agents without any past successes.18
18Which might be an explanation of why even ‘blatantly’ and repetitively false propaganda may work.
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Figure 11: Social influence y of agent 3 as a function of a, conformity of agents 1 and 2, and b, own
conformity.
But, of course, a crucial aspect in the current example has also been matrix Q, which determines
how agents form reference opinions, and which agents a particular agent strives to conform to, and which
we have assumed strictly positive. Of course, it might not be implausible to assume that Q depends, in
particular, on past performance. This is our final example.
Example 8.3. Let [Q(k)]ij =
[W(k)]ij
1−[W(k)]ij
for i 6= j and let [Q(k)]ii = 0 such that Q is formed in
an analogous way as W.19 In particular, in this setup, agents want to conform to those who have
performed well in the past. Assume that there are two types of agents, whereby one type has initial
beliefs centered around truth as in (6.1) and the other type has zero probability of ever being truthful,
Pr[bki (0) ∈ Bk,η] = 0 for all k and all i ∈ N2 where N2 ⊆ [n] is the set of agents of type two, and
by N1 we denote the set of agents of type one. Then, if τ = 0 and as k becomes large, W(k) has the
structure where in each row i, W
(k)
ij ≈ 1Cσ2
j
for j ∈ N1 (C is a normalization constant) and W (k)ij ≈ 0 for
j ∈ N2, by the results developed in Section 6, and where σ2j is the variance of agent j’s initial belief. The
informational social influence of agent i is then also given by, roughly, wi =
1
Cσ2
i
, for i ∈ N1, and wi = 0,
for i ∈ N2, respectively. Moreover, the combined informational as well as normative social influence of
agents is given by
vi =
(1− δi) · wi∑
j∈N1
(1− δj)wj
for agents i ∈ N1 and vi = 0 for agents i ∈ N2. These results follow directly from Theorem 1 and
Corollary 1 given in Buechel, Hellmann, and Klo¨ßner (2013) [15], which precisely state that closed and
strongly connected groups (which N1 is, at least for large k) have social influence vi as given and the
‘rest of the world’, which group N2 forms, has vi = 0.
This example shows that if Q follows the structure ofW, then, unlike in the previous example where
Q was uniform (or at least strictly positive on the off-diagonals), agents that never know truth cannot
be influential. It moreover shows that social influence decreases in conformity (for the agents in N1), as
we have already observed in the previous example.
Investigating social influence in the general case, for arbitrary Q,W, and ∆, would be highly inter-
esting, as it indicates to which degree agents who are never truthful can still be influential, and scope
for future work.20
19As mentioned, this is the specification discussed in Buechel, Hellmann, and Klo¨ßner (2013) [15].
20Proposition 8.4 is an important step in this direction already, since it says that if Q(k) is strictly positive on all
off-diagonals, ∆(k) is strictly positive in all diagonals, andW(k) has two positive columns, then all agents are influential.
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9 Homophily
In this section, we extend the standard endogenous weight adjustment opinion dynamics model discussed
in Section 6 by introduction of the concept of homophily, according to which, as McPherson, Smith-Lovin,
and Cook (2001) [65] phrase it, ‘similarity breeds connection’, and which is a majorly accepted standard
concept in modern socio-economic research. In the opinion dynamics literature, homophily has been
modeled by positing that weights (social ties) between any two agents are functionally dependent on
the agents’ current belief distance (cf. the Hegselmann and Krause models, Deffuant, Neau, Amblard,
and Weisbuch (2000) [23], Pan (2010) [67], etc.), that is, agents with more similar current beliefs place
greater (current) weight upon each other. Opinion updating is then performed as in standard DeGroot
learning, via weighted averages of peers’ past beliefs, where the weights are now endogenously formed
by the homophily principle. As indicated in the introduction, we think of homophily, in our context, as
arising from biased reasoning, where individuals overrate beliefs that are similar to their own (cf. Kunda
(1990) [55]).
In the Hegselmann and Krause models, to which we relate, agents set time-varying weights according
to the following rule,21
Wij(t) =
{
1
Ii(b(t))
if j ∈ Ii(b(t)),
0 else,
where Ii(b(t)) denotes the set of agents within an ηH -radius, for ηH ≥ 0, around agent i’s belief bi(t) at
time t, that is, Ii(b(t)) = {j ∈ [n] | ‖bj(t)− bi(t)‖ < ηH}, and where ηH is an external parameter. One
plausible integration of this setup in our framework is to let agents increment weights to other agents
whenever distance between their current beliefs is sufficiently small, that is,22,23
W
(k)
ij (t+ 1) =
{
W
(k)
ij (t) + δH if j ∈ Ii(b(t)),
W
(k)
ij (t).
(9.1)
Then, after truth is revealed, agents again adjust weights according to the ‘truth related’ principles
outlined in Section 3. In particular, we would now have,
W
(k+1)
ij (0) =
{
limt→∞W
(k)
ij (t) + δT · T (
∣∣N(bk(τ), µk)∣∣) if ∥∥bkj (τ)− µk∥∥ < ηT ,
limt→∞W
(k)
ij (t) otherwise,
(9.2)
for all k ≥ 1, where we need to consider, for next topic’s initial weights, the limit, as time goes to
infinity, of the time-varying weights for the previous topic, since weights are now also adjusted within
topic periods. Note that, here, we also subscript η — the radius within which weights are adjusted
— and δ — the weight increment — by T and H , respectively, depending on whether we relate to
adjusting/incrementing based on truth or based on homophily.
Also observe that (9.2) is well-defined only if limt→∞W
(k)
ij (t) exists, which we na¨ıvely assume in the
following but the formal proof of which we leave open. It is worthwhile mentioning that adjusting weights
based on truth may microeconomically be justified precisely as we did in Section 4 — namely, it may
follow from the tenet that agents have disutility from not knowing truth, whence, by incrementing weights
to agents who have been truthful in the past, they increase their likelihood of eventually becoming close
to truth, provided that the assumptions they make (bona fides, etc.) are satisfied. In contrast, we offer no
explicit microeconomic foundation — that is, based on utility functions and their explicit maximization
— here of why agents would increment weights to other agents based on the homophily relation, taking
this behavior simply as a form of (exogenous) bias. Moreover, similar as in the opposition model, it is
21Note that, thus far, we have assumed weights to be only varying across topics and not in addition across discussion
rounds (time) within a given topic.
22Otherwise, if weights were not incremented but rather set in an ‘absolute manner’, the continuity of weight relationships
across topics could not be maintained.
23After each round t, we renormalize weights in order for them to satisfy the row-stochasticity condition.
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appropriate, in the current setting, to think of agents as motivated by two contrarian forces — truth
and homophily —24 which may possibly act to the ‘same ends’, but which we generally think of as of
antipodal origin and direction.
Concerning updating of beliefs, beliefs evolve according to
bki (t+ 1) =
n∑
j=1
W
(k)
ij (t)b
k
j (t), (9.3)
as outlined in Section 3, with the addition that we now let weights W
(k)
ij vary within discussion periods.
Due to the slightly greater complexity involved in belief dynamics, we summarize the belief evolution
process in the below schematic form.
1: let W(1)(0) be (exogenously) given
2: for k = 1, 2, 3, . . . do
3: let bki (0) denote initial beliefs for topic Xk for all agents i = 1, . . . , n
4: for t = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, . . . do
5: adjust weights W(k)(t) based on homophily, Eq. (9.1); normalize weights
6: update beliefs bki (t+ 1) for all agents i via Eq. (9.3)
7: end for
8: adjust weights W(k+1)(0) based on truth, Eq. (9.2); normalize weights
9: end for
Providing general results for the belief dynamics process currently under consideration is not so easy
since weights do not only vary by time now, but, in particular, by the current belief state vector b(k)(t).
Lorenz (2005) [59] gives convergence results for this general setup, which we list in Appendix A, whose
assumptions, however, do not apply to our situation. As a first illustration, still, we show that, unlike in
the standard model and under conformity, even after some agent has been truthful for a topic Xr, agents
need not converge to a consensus, but may hold distinct limiting beliefs about Xr+1; whether consensus
obtains or not may depend on the relative sizes of δT , which we may think of as ‘importance of truth’,
versus δH , which we may think of as ‘importance of homophily’.
Example 9.1. Let there be n = 4 agents. Assume thatW(1)(0) is the n×n identity matrix. Moreover,
let τ = 0 and assume that agent 1 receives initial signal b11(0) = µ1 and that agents 2, 3 and 4 are not
within an ηT -radius around truth, for topic X1. Finally, assume that any two agents’ initial beliefs b
1
i (0)
and b1j(0) are at least a distance of ηH away from each other for topic X1 so that homophily plays no
role for topic X1. Then, at the beginning of topic X2, agents adjust weights based on truth such that
W(2)(0) looks as follows
W(2)(0) =
1
1 + δT


1 + δT 0 0 0
δT 1 0 0
δT 0 1 0
δT 0 0 1

 .
Assume that initial beliefs of agents for topic X2 are b
2
1(0) = b
2
2(0) and b
2
3(0) = b
2
4(0), whereby initial
beliefs of agents 1 and 2, on the one hand, and 3 and 4, on the other hand, are at a distance of at
least ηH . This specification means that agents 1 and 2, on the one hand, and 3 and 4, on the other,
form distinct ‘homophily clusters’, at least at time t = 0, for topic X2. In Figure 12, we sketch belief
dynamics for topic X2 for different values of δH , with δT = 0.1 and ηH = ηT = 0.2 fixed. We see that,
unlike in the standard DeGroot learning case in this setup (and also in the conformity model) and as
already indicated, agents do not necessarily reach a consensus. If homophily is ‘too strong’, that is, δH
is ‘too large’, agents polarize in this setting. As homophily becomes weaker, that is, δH becomes smaller,
the beliefs of agents 3 and 4 move closer to the beliefs of agents 1 and 2, the former of which has been
truthful for topic X1. As δH falls below a certain threshold, the agents reach a consensus.
24Note that in the opposition model, the two forces were an agent’s ingroup and his outgroup.
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Figure 12: Belief dynamics for topic X2 with setup as sketched in Example 9.1. Initial beliefs are
b21(0) = b
2
2(0) = 1, b
2
3(0) = b
2
4(0) = 0. As long as beliefs of agents 3 and 4 do not come within distance
of ηH = 0.2 to the beliefs of agents 1 and 2, the latters’ beliefs evolve according to b
2
1(t) = b
2
2(t) = 1
since both agents have the same initial beliefs and are not ‘disturbed’ by agents 3 and 4. In contrast,
beliefs of agents 3 and 4 are affected by agent 1’s beliefs since agent 1 has been truthful for topic X1,
but their weight link to this agent vanishes as t becomes large if δH is ‘large enough’. In general, we
have b21(t) = b
2
2(t) and b
2
3(t) = b
2
4(t) for all t ≥ 0 so that it suffices to graph belief dynamics of agents 1,
on the one hand, and 3, on the other.
To sketch one (simple) result of a general nature, here, however, consider, similarly as before, the
situation when there are two groups N1 and N2 of agents, whereby agents in N1 are ǫ-intelligent, for
a fixed ǫ ≥ 0, and agents in N2 have initial beliefs bki (0) with Pr[bki (0) ∈ Bk,ηT ] = 0, that is, agents
in N2 have initial beliefs such that the probability that they ‘correspond to’ truth is zero. In the next
proposition, we show that all agents may become ǫ-wise, even if δH > 0, in this situation provided that
agents value truth ‘sufficiently much’ and value relations based on homophily sufficiently little. This
result is not entirely trivial because, for instance, for our opposition model, arbitrarily small ‘opposition
force’ could induce (at least some) agents to not converge to truth. The result says that homophily does
not always need to interfere with wisdom.
Proposition 9.1. Let ηT ≥ 0, ǫ ∈ [0, ηT ], and topic Xk be fixed, for k ≥ 2.25 Then there exist δT > 0
large enough and δH > 0 small enough such that all agents become ǫ-wise for Xk.
26
Proof. Since the agents in N1 are ǫ-intelligent, with ǫ ≤ ηT , all agents adjust weights for these agents
based on truth. By choosing δT large enough and δH small enough (but positive), it can be ensured
that beliefs [bk(1)]i, for all i ∈ [n], are in the (open) ǫ-interval around truth µk (the weights for the
ǫ-intelligent agents may become arbitrarily close to uniform provided δT is large enough and δH is small
enough and the weights for the agents in N2 may become arbitrarily close to zero). Since W(k)(t) is
row-stochastic, for every t ≥ 0, and since the (open) interval of radius ǫ around truth is a convex set, all
belief vectors bk(t), for t ≥ 1, lie, component-wise, in Bk,ǫ.
Remark 9.1. In the last proposition, δT = δT (k) and δH = δH(k) may depend upon the topic Xk
(e.g., in particular on the distribution of initial beliefs for this topic). If we let, δT := maxk∈N δT (k) and
δH := mink∈N δH(k),
27 then for this choice of δT and δH , all agents will be ǫ-wise for all topics Xk, for
k ≥ 2.
25For topic X1, there are no weight adjustments based on truth, so we exclude this situation.
26Of course, if δH were zero, any positive δT would satisfy the conditions of the proposition. In our setup, we assume,
however, that homophily always plays a role, that is, δH > 0 for all ‘homophily increments’ δH .
27This would require to ensure that the so defined δH is strictly positive (rather than zero) and that δT <∞.
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Example 9.2. We illustrate Proposition 9.1 in Figure 13, where we sketch belief dynamics for a sequence
of topics for fixed parametrizations and various choices of δT and δH . In the figure, we simulate belief
dynamics across topics for n = 50 agents, where n1 = 10 agents are ǫ-intelligent and n2 = 40 agents have
initial distribution of beliefs such that their initial beliefs are never in an ηT interval around truth; for
the sake of concreteness, we let µk = 0, for all k ≥ 1, ǫ = 0.25, ηT = 0.25, and for the agents in N2, we
let their initial beliefs be distributed according to the random uniform distribution on the interval [1, 4].
The graphs illustrate, first, that truth attracts all agents since even the beliefs of the agents in N2
move in the direction of truth, as time progresses. However, as long as preference for homophily δH
is not small enough and preference for truth δT is not large enough, the agents in N2 do not become
ǫ-wise for topics. The graphs also illustrate the clustering of beliefs due to the homophily relationship,
a circumstance well-known from the classical Hegselmann-Krause models.
Remark 9.2. The graphs in Figure 13 show much analogy with results of the original opinion dynamics
model ‘under homophily’ as developed in the work of Hegselmann and Krause, on which our current
modeling is based (recall that the difference is that we increment weights in case two agents’ beliefs are
similar, while they set weights uniformly in this case, and that we in addition introduce truth as an
influential factor). In particular, in the graphs, we find that
• the opinion dynamics process always converges, and that
• agents (or, rather, their beliefs) cluster into subgroups in which agents reach a consensus.
Proving these apparently generally true observations is beyond the scope of our investigation here, and
we leave it for future consideration.28
We close this section by presenting simulations on the role of the truth related radius ηT and the
homophily related radius ηH , respectively. Concerning ηH , we find in Figure 14 that a smaller ηH (that
is, based on homophily, agents trust/listen to only those with very similar beliefs) tends to produce a
larger degree of fragmentation of limiting belief spectra while larger ηH (that is, based on homophily,
agents even trust/listen to agents with rather distinct beliefs) tends to promote global agreement among
agents. Interestingly, smaller ηH also leads agents closer to truth (since the homophily relation applies
to fewer agents). Concerning ηT , in Figure 15, we find that, overall, an increase in ηT increases the
average distance of limiting beliefs to truth since also beliefs that are remote from truth are taken into
consideration in link weight adjustment.
In sum, in this section, we have shown that, under the ‘homophily bias’ and under the presence of
agents with biased initial beliefs, agents need neither become wise nor reach a consensus. If the homophily
relation is sufficiently ‘weak’, wisdom may obtain (Proposition 9.1), but if it sufficiently ‘strong’, agents’
beliefs will generally cluster into distinct regions of the belief spectrum. As in the conformity model
(and also as under opposition), even agents with zero probability of being close to truth may influence
others.
10 Conclusion
As Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2011) [3], and many others, point out, the importance of the beliefs we
hold cannot be overstated. For example, the demand for a product depends on consumers’ opinions and
beliefs about the quality of that product and majority opinions determine the political agenda. Thus,
beliefs also shape (our) behavior in that they lead us to buy certain products and reject others or in that
they are causal factors for the implementation of laws and policies. On a more abstract level, the set of
norms and beliefs we hold determine, in the end, who we are and substantiate our cultural foundations.
In modern microeconomic research, beliefs and opinions are thought to originate from social learning
processes whereby individuals are situated in a network of peers and update their opinions, e.g., via
communication with others. Rejecting the hypothesis that individuals are fully rational, much recent
28See Krause (2000) [54] for a starting point on how to prove the results in question.
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Figure 13: Parametrizations throughout: ǫ = 0.25, µk = 0 for all k ≥ 1, ηT = ηH = 0.25, n = 50
agents, |N1| = 10, |N2| = 40. From top to bottom and left to right: (δH , δT ) = (0.2, 1.0); (δH , δT ) =
(0.1, 1.0); (δH , δT ) = (0.05, 1.0); (δH , δT ) = (0.02, 1.0); (δH , δT ) = (0.02, 0.1). We show topics Xk, for
k = 1, 2, . . . , 20 and, for each topic, discussion rounds t = 0, 1, . . . , 10.
research has assumed that people learn from others via simple ‘rules of thumb’, simply averaging peers’
past beliefs to arrive at new beliefs. Then, given that there exist ‘true states’ for the issues that individuals
hold beliefs about, a natural question to ask is whether such agents, who commit the bias of not properly
accounting for the repetition of information they hear, can, in fact, still learn these true states and, thus,
become collectively ‘wise’ (cf. Surowiecki (2004) [69]), successfully aggregating dispersed information.
In the current work, we have studied belief dynamics under an endogenous network formation process.
In particular, we have assumed that agents strengthen their ties to other agents based on the criterion of
‘past performance’ such that agents increment their trust weights to whoever has been ‘close enough’ to
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Figure 14: Parametrizations throughout: ǫ = 0.25, µk = 0 for all k ≥ 1, ηT = 0.25, δH = 0.2, δT = 1.0,
n = 50 agents, |N1| = 10, |N2| = 40. From top to bottom and left to right: ηH = 0.05, ηH = 0.25,
ηH = 1.10, ηH = 1.50. We show topics Xk, for k = 1, 2, . . . , 20 and, for each topic, discussion rounds
t = 0, 1, . . . , 10.
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Figure 15: Parametrizations throughout: ǫ = 0.25, µk = 0 for all k ≥ 1, ηH = 0.25, δH = 0.2, δT = 1.0,
n = 50 agents, |N1| = 10, |N2| = 40. Left: ηT = 0.25. Right: ηT = 2.50. We show topics Xk, for
k = 1, 2, . . . , 20 and, for each topic, discussion rounds t = 0, 1, . . . , 10.
truth for a current topic. We have, moreover, assumed that agents are multiply biased in that they are
not only susceptible to persuasion bias — the simplifying DeGroot learning rule — but also have biased
initial beliefs (the possibly non-social, ‘intelligence-based’ substrate of beliefs), and commit several other
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sins of reasoning, such as being biased toward members of their in-group and motivated to disassociate
from members of their out-group, being motivated to conform with the beliefs of their reference group,
or overrating beliefs that are close to their own. Our goal has been to outline situations under which
collective failure (or at least, ‘failure of wisdom’) can obtain, even though the potential for wisdom —
dispersed correct information — is assured. Thus, our work was also in part targeted at the recent
‘optimism’ concerning biased (‘na¨ıve’) learning in social networks and crowd wisdom (e.g., Golub and
Jackson (2010) [39]), which has also been challenged by experimental research (cf., e.g., Lorenz, Rauhut,
Schweitzer, and Helbing (2011) [62]).
As to our results, under the standard DeGroot learning model, we have seen that wisdom can fail if
there are sufficiently many agents with biased initial beliefs such that they, still, have positive probability
of being close to truth. The intuition behind this result is that even if the biased agents have small, but
positive, probability of ‘guessing’ truth, then, if they are sufficiently many — such that many of them will
still be close to truth — the biased agents can, in total, receive large enough weight mass from all agents,
whence they may become arbitrarily socially influential, leading all of society to the expected value of a
biased variable, away from truth. This result may be thought of as based on the bona fides bias, which
says that agents do not give up the assumption that their own (initial) beliefs are unbiased and that
others’ beliefs share this property with their own, even despite potential collective failure, from which it
may be motivated that agents continuously apply their trust weight incrementing rule (to all agents). In
the conformity model, wisdom may fail even when the biased agents have zero probability of being close
to truth and when their number is small, provided that the unbiased agents are sufficiently conforming.
We might take this as an argument for why even ‘blatantly’ and repetitively false propaganda could
work. A necessary condition for this result is that agents want to conform to reference groups including
even biased and completely unknowing agents (which might be justified on grounds/biases such as truth-
unrelated prominence, e.g., due to political power or popularity). In the opposition model, wisdom can
fail even if all agents’ initial beliefs are unbiased and, in addition, arbitrarily close to truth, merely as a
consequence of agents being attracted by contrarian forces — their in-groups, on the one hand, which
attract them toward truth, and their out-groups, on the other, from which they want to disassociate.
In the homophily model, wisdom can fail because agents are, again, influenced by antagonistic forces —
truth, on the one hand, and agents with similar beliefs, on the other. Hence, biased agents’ beliefs may
cluster, if they form a homogenous group, and unbiased agents’ beliefs may also cluster, so that some
agents would become wise and others not.
Concerning future research directions within our context, of course, endogenizing several (more) of
the parameters of the DeGroot learning models that we have discussed might be of interest. In the
current work, we have solely endogenized the social network, without explaining, for example, where
in-group/out-group antagonisms actually come from or how conformity may develop and how reference
groups evolve. The endogenizing of such parameters would plausibly require psychological and socio-
economic motivations that are independent of the criterion of ‘past performance’. Moreover, in our model,
we have generally assumed that agents are homogenous with respect to many dimensions of attributes
such as their truth tolerances η, trust weight increments δ, etc., and a heterogenous setup may provide
further insight. Finally, introducing strategic agents (cf., e.g., Anderlini, Gerardi and Lagunoff (2012)
[5]), that potentially have incentives to deliberatively mislead others, might be a promising research
direction to incorporate in our general setup of social learning and collective wisdom/failure.
Appendix A Proofs
Standard model
Lemma A.1. If matrix A ∈ Rn×n has identical rows with row sum s = ∑nj=1 Aij , then At = st−1A
for any t ≥ 1.
Proof. Follows by induction.
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Wisdom of crowds under initial beliefs centered around truth
The following are results from Golub and Jackson (2010) [39]. They state conditions under which a
growing population, parametrized by its size n, converges to truth µ under the assumption that agents
receive initial belief signals that are centered around µ (as in (6.1)). The statement of the below results
is that agents become (ǫ-)wise (for any ǫ > 0) if and only if the influence of the most influential agent
converges to zero as n increases, whereby an agent’s influence is given by his social influence, as we
have discussed above and as we define below. In undirected networks (Wij = Wji for all i, j ∈ [n])
with uniform weights, this condition is tantamount to all agents’ relative degrees (the number of links
they have to other agents divided by the total number of links in the network) converging to zero as n
becomes large. Hence, in this setup, an obstacle to wisdom would be the circumstance when each agent
who newly enters society assigns, e.g., a constant fraction of his links to a particular agent, who would
then become excessively influential.
Remark A.1. If a social network W induces a consensus, then limiting beliefs can be represented as
b(∞) = s⊺b(0), for a non-negative vector s with ∑ni=1 si = 1 which we call the social influence vector
and si agent i’s influence. The influence vector is given as the unique normalized unit-vector s which
satisfies s = W⊺s (i.e., s is the normalized unit-eigenvector of W⊺ corresponding to the eigenvalue
λ = 1).
Now, as in Golub and Jackson (2010) [39], we parametrize social networksW by their population size
n, which we denote byW(n); we also parametrize other quantities such as limiting beliefs of a set of agents
by population size n (here and in the following, we omit reference to topics k for notational convenience).
Moreover, we denote a society by the sequence
(
W(n)
)
n∈N
. We restate the following lemma and the
proposition from Golub and Jackson (2010) [39], which they list as Lemma 1 and Proposition 2.
Lemma A.2 (A law of large numbers). If
(
s(n)
)
n∈N
is any sequence of influence vectors, then
s(n)⊺b(0;n)→ µ as n→∞
(where convergence is in probability or almost surely) if and only if s1(n)→ 0, where we assume, without
loss of generality, that s1(n) ≥ s2(n) ≥ · · · ≥ sn(n).
Proposition A.1. If
(
W(n)
)
n∈N
is a sequence of networks, each inducing a consensus, then the under-
lying agents become (ǫ-)wise (for any ǫ > 0) as n→∞ if and only if the associated influence vectors are
such that s1(n)→ 0 as n→∞.
We now argue informally that the proposition entails convergence to truth in the situation where
agents’ initial beliefs are centered around truth as in (6.1) and in our setup of endogenous weight
formation.29 Namely, we first argue that an agent’s influence si is directly inversely proportional to
his variance σ2i . Although a proof thereof would require technical sophistication, the claim appears very
intuitive since influence si captures weight mass assigned to an agent by other agents (in addition to
these agents’ influence; cf. DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel (2003) [25]) and, in our setup, the weight
mass that an agent receives is directly inversely proportional to his variance σ2i (more intelligent agents
receive weight increases more often). Next, consider networks
(
W(n)
)
n∈N
where, for all n ∈ N, agents’
variances σ2i satisfy σ
2
i ≥ σ¯2 > 0 for some lower bound σ¯2 > 0.30 Then, as n → ∞, the influence of
the most influential agent certainly goes to zero since the number of agents increases (all of which are
influential in the sense that they receive weight mass from others) while the expected weight mass that
the most influential agent receives is bounded.
29We assume that k is so large that each network W(k)(n) always induces a consensus. Note that, if agents are
stochastically intelligent, a consensus is reached quickly (and increasingly fast in the number of agents n), by the results
developed in Section 6.
30Should there be no lower bound on the most intelligent agent’s variance, then this agent may become excessively
influential but his initial beliefs also become arbitrarily accurate, so that society becomes (ǫ-)wise simply because one agent
is arbitrarily well-informed.
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Varying weights on own beliefs
Proof of Proposition 6.9. Since W = W(k) converges for all initial belief vectors b(0), there exists a
matrix W∞ such that limt→∞W
t =W∞. To prove the proposition, show that
∏t−1
s=0W(λs) converges
to W∞ as t→∞, whereby W(λ) =
(
(1− λ)I+ λW
)
and where b(t) =
(∏t−1
s=0W(λs)
)
b(0) according
to (6.4). Proceed exactly as in DeMarzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel (2003) [25].
Define the random variable Λt to be equal to 1 with probability λt and zero otherwise. Assume also
that Λt are independent over time. Define the random matrix Zt by Zt =
∏t−1
s=0W(Λs) = W
∑t−1
s=0 Λs .
Then E[Zt] =
∏t−1
s=0W(λs). By the Borel-Cantelli lemma, if
∑∞
t=0 Pr[Λt = 1] =
∑∞
t=0 λt =∞, then
Pr[
∞∑
t=0
Λt =∞] = Pr[Λt = 1 infinitely often] = 1.
Since the matrix Wt is bounded uniformly in t, the dominated convergence theorem implies that
lim
t→∞
t−1∏
s=0
W(λs) = lim
t→∞
E[Zt] = lim
t→∞
E[W
∑t−1
s=0 Λs ] =W∞.
Opposition
Lemma A.3. Consider any n× n matrix A of the form
A =


β α . . . α
α β . . . α
... . . .
. . .
...
α α . . . β

 (A.1)
with α, β ∈ R. The eigenvalues of matrix A are given by λ1 = β + (n− 1)α and λ2 = · · · = λn = β − α.
Proof. We first consider the determinant of A = A(n). Subtracting the second row from the first, we
find det(A(n)) = (β − α) det(A(n − 1)) + (β − α) det(B(n − 1)), where B(n) is the n × n matrix with
[B(n)]ij = [A(n)]ij for all i, j with (i, j) 6= (1, 1); for (i, j) = (1, 1), we have [B(n)]ij = α. Proceeding
analogously as for A(n), we find det(B(n)) = (β − α)n−1α. Therefore,
det(A(n)) = (β − α)n−1(β + (n− 1)α).
Now, consider the characteristic polynomial of A(n); it is χ(λ) = det(A− λIn). Note that A− λIn is a
matrix of the form (A.1). Hence, its determinant is given by
χ(λ) =
(
(β − α)− λ
)n−1(
β + α(n− 1)− λ
)
.
This concludes the proof.
Lemma A.4. Consider any matrix of the form (7.4) with a, b, c, d > 0 and such that
∑n
j=1 |Aij | = 1 for
all i = 1, . . . , n. Let n1 = 1. Then, the characteristic polynomial of A is given by
χ(λ) = det(A− λIn) = (−λ)n−2
(
λ2 − (a+ (n− 1)d)λ+ (n− 1)(ad− bc)
)
= (−λ)n−2(λ− 1)(λ− q),
where q = (n− 1)(ad− bc) = a− 1 + (n− 1)d.
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Proof. Expanding the determinant along the last row (and subtracting the second-to-last row from the
last), we find that the determinant det(Bn) of Bn = An − λIn, with An = A, is given by
−λdet(Bn−1)− λdet(Cn−1)
whereby Cn = An − λIn, except for the entry in row n and column n, which is [Cn]nn = Ann. The
determinant of Cn can easily be found to be (−λ)n−2 ·
(
(a−λ)d−bc
)
. Then solving det(An) inductively
leads to the required solution. Finally, the factorization of the quadratic polynomial results from the
fact that A has one eigenvalue of 1, as can readily be checked.
From Lemma A.4, we can infer that matrix A from (7.4) has n− 2 eigenvalues 0, one eigenvalue of 1,
and one eigenvalue q, which is a real eigenvalue. Moreover, all eigenvalues of A are bounded from above
by 1 (cf. Eger (2013) [30], Proposition 6.3). Assume that q were −1. Then
a− 1 + (n− 1)d = q = −1 ⇐⇒ a+ (n− 1)d = 0 ⇐⇒ a = −(n− 1)d,
whence a is negative, which contradicts a > 0. Thus, assume q were +1. Then
a+ (n− 1)d = 2,
which contradicts a+ (n− 1)d = a+ n2d < 1+ 1 = 2 (since both b and c are positive and recall the row
sum restrictions n1a+n2b = 1, etc.). Therefore, λ = 1 is the only eigenvalue of A on the unit circle and
it has algebraic multiplicity of 1.
Conformity
Lemma A.5. Consider In−A for an n×n matrix A. If limk→∞Ak = 0, then In−A is invertible and
its inverse is given by the Neumann series
(In −A)−1 =
∞∑
k=0
Ak.
Proof. See Meyer (2000) [66], p.618.
Proof of Proposition 8.1. Our proof follows along the lines of the proof of the corresponding proposition
of Buechel, Hellmann, and Klo¨ßner (2012) [14].
The best response s∗i of player i to the strategies s−i of the other players is given by the first order
conditions,
∂ui(si, s−i; bi)
∂si
|si=s∗i = −2(1− δi)(s∗i − bi)− 2δi
(
s∗i −
∑
j 6=i
Qijsj
)
= 0
for all i ∈ [n]. Note that the best response is unique. A strategy profile s∗ ∈ Sn is a Nash equilibrium if
and only if s∗i is a best response to s
∗
−i. Thus, Nash equilibria s
∗ ∈ Sn satisfy:
(In −∆)(s∗ − b) +∆(s∗ −Qs∗) = (In −∆)(s∗ − b) +∆(In −Q)s∗ = 0.
Rewriting leads to
s∗ = (In −∆Q)−1(In −∆)b,
which is well-defined since In −∆Q is invertible by Lemma A.5. Namely, we have
‖∆Q‖k ≤ ‖∆‖k ‖Q‖k ≤
(
max
i∈[n]
∣∣δi∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:δmax
)k
‖Q‖k
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for any matrix norm ‖·‖. Hence,
0 ≤ lim
k→∞
‖∆Q‖k ≤ lim
k→∞
(δmax)
k ‖Q‖k = 0,
since |δi| < 1 by assumption, for all i ∈ [n], and ‖Q‖k is bounded since Q is row-stochastic. Therefore,
limk→∞(∆Q)
k = 0.
Proof of Lemma 8.1. Consider M1 (which is M · 1), which is
D1+ (W −D)(In −∆Q)−1(In −∆)1.
It suffices to show that
R1 := (In −∆Q)−1(In −∆)1 = 1
because of row-stochasticity of W, which entails that W1 = 1.
Now, we have (In −∆Q)−1 =
∑∞
r=0(∆Q)
r by row-stochasticity of Q and since |δi| < 1. Hence
R1 =
∞∑
r=0
(∆Q)r(In −∆)1 = (In −∆)1+
∞∑
r=1
(∆Q)r−1[∆Q1−∆Q∆1]
= (In −∆)1+
∞∑
r=1
(∆Q)r−1[∆1−∆Q∆1] = (In −∆)1+ (In −∆Q)−1[In −∆Q]∆1
= (In −∆)1+∆1 = 1.
Proposition A.2. In the situation of Example 8.2, the social influence weights x, x and y of agents 1, 2
and 3 are given by
x =
2(1− a)
4− ab− 3a, and y =
a(1− b)
4− ab− 3a .
Proof. The social influence weights can be found by computing M and then solving M⊺x = x where
x = (x, x, y)⊺. The computation, though cumbersome, is straightforward.
Homophily
The following theorem is the ‘stabilization theorem’ of Lorenz (2005) [59]. It discusses convergence of
the opinion dynamics process b(t+ 1) =W(b(t), t)b(t), where weight matrix W may depend on time t
and the current vector of beliefs b(t), as in the homophily model we have sketched. We abbreviate the
theorem to fit our needs.
Theorem A.1 (Lorenz (2005) [59]). Let (W(t))t∈N be a sequence of row-stochastic matrices. If each
matrix W(t) satisfies
(1) [W(t)]ii > 0 for all i ∈ [n] (‘each agent has a little bit of self-confidence’),
(2) [W(t)]ij > 0 ⇐⇒ [W(t)]ji > 0 (‘confidence is mutual’),
(3) there exists κ > 0 (that is independent of t) such that the smallest positive entry ofW(t) is greater
than κ (‘positive weights do not converge to zero’),
then limt→∞ b(t) exists, that is, the belief dynamics process converges.
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While Theorem A.1 applies, in particular, to the Hegselmann and Krause models, on which our
homophily model rests, it does not apply to the latter. This is easy to see: while condition (1) in the
theorem on W(t) is satisfied in our case (due to δH > 0 and
∥∥bki (t)− bki (t)∥∥ = 0 < ηH for any positive
ηH), both conditions (2) and (3) may be violated in our modeling. Condition (2) may be violated because
of truth related weight adjustment, which is generally asymmetric (agent i may have been true for a
topic Xk, while j may not have been true so that j increases his weight for i while i does not increase
his weight for j); and condition (3) may be violated because a positive link weight between two agents
may converge to zero in our model, e.g., when an agent i has known truth for a topic, so that another
agent j increases his link weight for i (based on truth), but i and j’s beliefs are sufficiently distinct such
that homophily, toward other agents, causes the link weight [W(t)]ji to drop to zero, as t→∞.
Appendix B Experiment
Below, we list details on the experiment indicated in the introduction. In total, n = 119 subjects, all from
Amazon Mechanical Turk, participated in the experiment; not all subjects answered all questions.31 We
set a time limit for answering the 16 ‘common knowledge’ questions of 3 minutes and reimbursed subjects
with 60 US cents if they completed and submitted the questions (this required them to press the ‘submit’
button rather than to indeed answer all questions), which corresponds to an hourly wage of 12 USD.
Obviously, this was an attractive wage, since all requested slots (119) were filled within approximately
one hour. On average, individuals took 2 minutes and 25 seconds to answer all 16 questions, including
reading the instructions and optionally providing feedback, although some subjects complained that time
limits were too narrow. Below, we summarize the instructions, the questions, and give histograms of the
distributions of answers (Figure 16) as well as of the ‘logarithmically scaled’ data — for some questions,
individuals beliefs’ seemed to be lognormally distributed, so we provide these histograms in Figure 17.
We note that we — very slightly — adjusted the data when it very obviously seemed to be corrupted.
For example, one person gave as average daily temperature in Miami in July the number 8856347, which
cannot plausibly be correct; similarly, two people answered the question concerning the age of homo
sapiens sapiens as 80 years, which constitutes most probably a misunderstanding of the question.
From the histograms in Figures 16 and 17, we observe that people’s beliefs appear to be centered
around truth only occasionally. In particular, for example, the histogram for the question concerning
the average height of an adult male US American appears to be consistent with independent normal
distributions, centered around truth, as underlying subjects’ beliefs. For the question regarding the
number of official languages of the European union, the population density of Beijing, and the distance
from earth to moon, independent lognormal distributions appear as plausible. As we have already
discussed in the introduction, neither the mean nor the median are very reliable quantities for the true
values of questions, as Table 2 illustrates.
Instructions
Give truthful estimates on 16 questions such as “When did the first settlers arrive in America?”. Don’t
look them up, don’t google them. We’re interested in your honest estimate/guess, not in your ability to
use search engines. If you don’t know the correct answer, please try to provide your best guess. Please
answer all 16 questions.
A valid answer to the above question might be “in 1620” (if this is what you think the correct answer
is). Certainly don’t take longer than 20 seconds to answer any one question.
If your answer requires a unit such as “pounds”, “miles”, or “kilometers”, please indicate it, for the sake
of clarity.
31The data set is available upon request.
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(1) the average daily temperature in Miami in July (in Fahrenheit or Celsius)? 87.8F
(2) the population size of New York city, as of 2012? 8, 336, 697
(3) the current level of the Dow Jones stock market index? 15, 658.36
(4) the number of official languages in the European Union? 24
(5) the age of modern humans (homo sapiens sapiens) on earth?
In other words, since how long do (modern) humans exist on earth? 200, 000
(6) the year the first world war started? 1914
(7) the number of McDonald’s restaurants in the US? 12, 804
(8) the number of people per square mile (or square kilometer) in China’s capital Beijing? 3, 300/sqm
(9) the how many-th US president was Bill Clinton? 42nd
(10) the average height of an adult male in the US as of 2012? (in feet and inches or centimeters) 177.8cm
(11) the distance from earth to the moon (in miles or kilometres)? 238, 610m
(12) the number of states the United States consists of? 50
(13) the fraction of population in the US that is left-handed in percent? 10.5%
(14) the average life-span of an African elephant (in years) in the wild? 56
(15) 17− 4× 2? 9
(16) the diameter of the sun in miles or kilometers? 857, 490m
Table 1: Questions, to be preceded by ‘What do you think is ...’, and ‘true’ answers. Most ‘true’ answers
are taken from wikipedia or similar resources.
Histogram of miami
miami
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
20 40 60 80 100 120
0
10
30
Histogram of newyork[newyork < 2e+07]
newyork[newyork < 2e+07]
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0.0e+00 5.0e+06 1.0e+07 1.5e+07
0
5
15
25
Histogram of dow[dow < 30000]
dow[dow < 30000]
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0 5000 10000 15000 20000
0
20
40
60
Histogram of europe[europe < 60]
europe[europe < 60]
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0
10
20
30
40
Histogram of (humans[humans < 5e+05])
(humans[humans < 5e+05])
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0e+00 1e+05 2e+05 3e+05 4e+05
0
20
40
60
Histogram of (first[first > 1880])
(first[first > 1880])
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
1880 1900 1920 1940 1960
0
20
40
60
80
Histogram of (mcdonalds[mcdonalds < 50000])
(mcdonalds[mcdonalds < 50000])
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0 10000 20000 30000 40000
0
10
20
30
40
Histogram of (beijing[beijing < 1e+05])
(beijing[beijing < 1e+05])
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0e+00 2e+04 4e+04 6e+04 8e+04 1e+05
0
20
40
60
80
Histogram of (clinton)
(clinton)
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0 20 40 60 80
0
20
40
60
Histogram of (height)
(height)
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
150 160 170 180 190
0
20
40
Histogram of (distance[distance < 2e+06])
(distance[distance < 2e+06])
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0 500000 1000000 1500000
0
20
40
Histogram of (states)
(states)
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
10 20 30 40 50 60
0
20
60
Histogram of (left)
(left)
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0
10
20
30
40
Histogram of (elephant)
(elephant)
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0 50 100 150 200
0
5
15
25
Histogram of (math[math <= 26])
(math[math <= 26])
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
20
40
60
Histogram of (sun[sun < 1e+06])
(sun[sun < 1e+06])
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0e+00 2e+05 4e+05 6e+05 8e+05 1e+06
0
20
40
60
Figure 16: Histograms of answers to questions (1) to (16), top to bottom and left to right. Mean (dotted
blue), median (dashed green), and truth (solid red) indicated.
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Figure 17: Histograms of log(answers) to questions (1) to (16), top to bottom and left to right. Mean
(dotted blue), median (dashed green), and truth (solid red) indicated.
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